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Abstract
Through studying the intersections of sanitation and segregation in Brooklyn, New York
in the post-WWII era, this thesis reveals a web of willful white negligence that constructed a
narrative that supports continued environmental injustices towards black Americans. As a result
of housing discrimination, the lack of sanitation, and the political and social climate of the 1950s,
black neighborhoods in Brooklyn became dirtier with abandoned garbage. Institutional antiblack racism not only permitted and supported the degradation of black neighborhoods, but also
created an association between black Americans and trash. In the present day, this narrative not
only leads to the increased segregation of black Americans into dirty neighborhoods, but also
justifies more environmental injustice in these vulnerable communities. Based on a case study of
Brooklyn in the 1950s, this thesis asserts that environmental injustices are more than just siting
landfills and toxic sites proximate to vulnerable neighborhoods, but rather they are dependent on
the creation and preservation of narratives that claim minority communities are naturally
predisposed to or deserving of living in dirty and unclean places.
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Terminology
At the time of this writing, there is some debate on whether the term “African American”
or “black American” is more appropriate to describe those who trace their ethnic origins to the
African continent. In 1991, Martin noted that there was a transition from the term “Negro” in the
mid-twentieth century to “black” in the 1960s and 1970s to “African-American” in the late 1980s
and 1990s as the most acceptable term because of its cultural significance.1 As Smith writes, the
switch to “African American” signified an attempt to “gain respect and standing in a society that
has held them to be subordinate and inferior.”2 However, in the 21st century there has been a
resurgence of the term “black.” As of a 2005 study by Sigelman et al., Americans of African
descent were pretty evenly split between those who prefer “black” and those who prefer
“African-American,” which was also quite dependent on personal history and the racial
composition of their social circles.3 Waters’ Black Identities describes identity in the United
States as beyond personal racial and ethnic identity, but also social perception of identity.4 Based
on existing scholarship and the current racially motivated social movement, “Black Lives Matter,”
I have elected to use the term “black” to describe this ethnic grouping. Although Agyemang et al.
argue that ethnically specific labels such as “African Kenyan” or “African Caribbean” should be
used while “black” should be phased out, the term “black” actually better suits my purposes of
describing structural racism in the United States against people with darker skin.5 I elected to use
a more all-encompassing term because all ethnicities within the term “black” were and are
1

Ben L. Martin, “From Negro to Black to African American: The Power of Names and Naming," Political Science
Quarterly 106, no. 1 (1991): 83.
2
Tom W. Smith, “Changing Racial Labels: From ‘Colored’ to ‘Negro’ to ‘Black’ to ‘African American,’” Public
Opinion Quarterly 56, no. 4 (1992): 496.
3
Lee Sigelman, Steven A. Tuch, and Jack K. Martin, “What’s in a Name? Preference for ‘Black’ versus ‘AfricanAmerican’ among Americans of African Descent,” Public Opinion Quarterly 69, no. 3 (2005): 429.
4
Mary C. Waters, Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities, (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2009), 44-93.
5
Charles Agyemang, Raj Bhopal, and Marc Bruijnzeels, “Negro, Black, Black African, African Caribbean, African
American or What? Labelling African Origin Populations in the Health Arena in the 21st Century,” Journal of
Epidemiology and Community Health 59, no. 12 (2005): 1014.
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subjected to this form of American racism. This is not to understate the heterogeneity of African
populations, but rather the term “black” serves to highlight how institutionalized racism in the
United States targets a group based on the color of their skin. However, when quoting directly
from sources I will use the terminology of the source to preserve the original meaning.

Introduction
Dirt and other waste matter derive their power not simply through being waste or having a kind
of negative value. Rather, as “matter out of place,” things deemed dirty, spoiled, or noxious
carry polluting effects, by touching.6
The morning of September 15, 1962 began like every Saturday morning did in New York
City. The Department of Sanitation (DS) employees went down the streets of BedfordStuyvesant in Brooklyn in their truck for the purpose of picking up bulk trash along Gates
Avenue, but in reality the sanitation workers left most of the waste on the street. Unlike every
other Saturday, however, an interracial group of about twenty members of the Congress of Racial
Equality (CORE) lay in wait. As the truck finished its route on Gates Avenue, the CORE
members followed with their own cars with U-Haul trailers attached to pick up the trash the
workers had neglected. As they continued on their mission, other Bedford-Stuyvesant residents
joined in until about fifty people were helping pick up the trash that lay ignored on their streets.
With their trailers full, the protesters arrived at the steps of the Brooklyn Borough Hall and
dumped all the refuse they had collected. Orange crates, carpets, mattresses, refrigerators, and
more piled onto the Borough Hall steps while some of the protestors began to form a picket line

6

Carl Zimring, Clean and White: A History of Environmental Racism in the United States, (New York: New York
University Press), 2015, 1.
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with signboards that read, “Taxation without Sanitation is Tyranny” and “Show us Integration
With Better Sanitation.” They named it Operation “Clean Sweep.”7
When I first sought to write this thesis, I knew that I wanted to examine waste issues in
U.S. history but I did not know in what capacity. My thesis started with a seemingly simple
question: why are inner cities and ethnic enclaves where black Americans reside typically
littered with trash?8 My initial reaction was to look at how black communities were zoned to live
in industrial corridors with heavy industry and incinerators, but after reading Brian Purnell’s
paper “‘Taxation without Sanitation is Tyranny’: Civil Rights Struggles Over Garbage
Collection in Brooklyn, New York During the Fall of 1962,” I realized discrimination against
black communities was more than these areas simply having more landfills or incinerators
nearby. Rather, the quality of sanitation and waste disposal in black communities was
significantly lower than white communities in the same borough during the 1960s, making their
neighborhoods dirtier from household trash as well as industrial waste. Drawing from a case
study of a “garbage protest” in the neighborhood of Bedford-Stuyvesant in Brooklyn, Purnell
argued that racism, specifically anti-black racism, played a major factor in the lack of waste
collection in low-income, black communities in Brooklyn. Therefore, Bedford-Stuyvesant’s
“trashed” state was due to “poor policies and inadequate budgets” for sanitation issues, not just a
few industrial sites or “dirty people” who did not know how to properly dispose of their trash.9
Purnell’s study challenged my assumptions about waste and complicated my initial question. I

7

Brian Purnell, “‘Taxation without Sanitation is Tyranny’: Civil Rights Struggles over Garbage Collection in
Brooklyn, New York during the Fall of 1962,” Afro-Americans in New York Life and History (July 2007), 75 - 6.
8
According to interviews with adolescent boys from a low-income neighborhood in New York City from Nicole
Schaefer-McDaniel’s 2007 study “‘They Be Doing Illegal Things’: Early Adolescents Talk About Their Inner-City
Neighborhoods,” their neighborhood routinely smelled of garbage and that there was always litter on the streets.
Judi Anne Caron’s 2010 study “Environmental Perspectives of Blacks: Acceptance of the ‘New Environmental
Paradigm’” details how blacks are positioned as “anti-environmental” because of the littered and dilapidated state of
their neighborhoods.
9
Purnell, 83.
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wanted to understand how waste infrastructure, specifically related to policy and budget
decisions, could have degraded to such a point that activists could pick up enough neglected
garbage that they could dump it onto the Borough Hall steps all morning.
Without learning about such an important narrative in waste history, I would have
completely disregarded the significance of the waste left behind in marginalized communities
and only focused on the locations of incinerators and landfills. A community does not need to
live near an incinerator for waste to adversely affect its residents. Scholars of environmental
justice such as Carl Zimring and Dolores Greenberg have studied how the waste industry has
stigmatized its workers as well as the structural problems with siting waste facilities near
communities of color, but few studies use the amount of litter on the streets to exhibit
environmental injustices in marginalized communities. This thesis seeks to expand the scope of
race and waste relations through demonstrating that the creation of a marginalized space is more
than measuring relative distance to toxic sites. Rather, marginalized spaces form as a result of the
dynamic relationships between “political and democratic space; institutional space; [and] spaces
of identity, place, and community.”10 Therefore, understanding the lack of sanitation in
Brooklyn’s black communities requires a more thorough study of the political climate of the
1950s, the overt and covert methods of racial discrimination, and people’s perception of waste.
Purnell argues there were two main causes for the neglect of waste in black communities.
First, World War II permitted people of color to escape established color lines to move to “white
neighborhoods,” causing many white residents to flee to suburbs on the outskirts of the city.11
Second, the reduction of services that resulted from the onset of WWII never changed in the

10

Gordon Walker, "Beyond Distribution and Proximity: Exploring the Multiple Spatialities of Environmental
Justice," Antipode 41, no. 4 (2009), 630.
11
Purnell, 62.
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inner city despite increased population and consumption.12 Although his paper makes these
claims, it does not go into detail of the specific policies or budget cuts, but rather focuses more
on the protest as an expression of the grievances that built up over the 1950s. Therefore, through
thoroughly exploring the 1950s I want to expand upon the Purnell’s research and demonstrate
that housing discrimination and white flight as well as inadequate waste management led to poor
sanitation in black communities in Brooklyn. However, my research further argues that the
political climate of the 1950s increased labor strikes in the private sanitation sector and also led
to anti-communist sentiment, which stifled black protests to racial and environmental injustices. I
also assert that local government only paid attention to white residents’ complaints. Finally, by
broadening the United States’ conceptualization of waste and applying it to critical race theory,
my thesis will explain why black Americans are associated with trash and why their
neighborhoods are subjected to so much trash through critically examining the post-WWII years
(1945-1960) and the institutions that were put in place during this time that quarantined black
people into the areas with the least sanitation.
Today, many black communities are undervalued and under resourced, and I argue that in
Brooklyn this was institutionalized in post-WWII America. My thesis seeks to deepen the history
of waste in Brooklyn during the 1950s in order to create a better understanding of the lasting
impacts post-war societal, political, and economic changes had on sanitation in black
communities. I hypothesize that due to the reallocation of federal funding from public services to
military spending during WWII, the quality of waste management in Brooklyn was severely
impacted during the 1950s. This was further exacerbated by the types of zoning imposed on
neighborhoods with high concentrations of people of color, the transition from the Depression
economy to the post-war economy, increased consumption, and, interestingly, the labor strikes.
12

Purnell, 64.
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As a result, waste accumulated in the industrialized inner city where people of color were forced
to live. Furthermore, anti-communist fervor silenced black protests against these injustices
because activists feared being labeled as communists. However, even after Bedford-Stuyvesant
residents protested in 1962, the United States proclaimed segregation illegal, and Brooklyn
improved its waste management, the sanitary conditions of Bedford-Stuyvesant did not change.
Therefore, I argue that the institutional factors that subjected black communities to poor
sanitation in the 1950s are no longer necessary, because they created an association between
waste and black Americans, which now justifies the amount of trash that litters the streets of
their communities, or as I refer to it the “trashed” or “dirty” state of their spaces.13
The first chapter of my thesis will frame my thesis within the larger theoretical
conversations about race and waste in both studies of environmental justice and of discard
studies. The second and third chapters will then delve into the main factors that led to the
sanitation and segregation issues of Brooklyn. Before exploring more direct factors that led to
increased sanitation issues in black communities, Chapter 2 will give a brief history of the
development of New York City and Brooklyn to contextualize its racial history. It will
specifically highlight the racial discrimination in relation to housing that occurred in the post-war
period. Finally, my second chapter will examine the transition of the United States’ patterns of
consumption after World War II as well as Brooklyn waste management in the post-war years
for the sake of contextualizing my argument in space and time. Chapter 3, on the other hand, will
analyze more indirect factors of the growth of waste and litter in black neighborhoods in
Brooklyn, such as anti-communist sentiment, workers going on strike, and the ways media
attention affected protests to sanitation issues. Finally, Chapter 4 will tie together waste theory
13

Stephen Grant Meyer, As Long as They Don't Move Next Door: Segregation and Racial Conflict in American
Neighborhoods (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 8.
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and environmental justice to the historical evidence I provide to more directly analyze how the
conflation of race and waste rhetoric justified segregation of black communities into
marginalized spaces perceived as dirty.

Chapter One: Constructing the Narrative of Waste
Any historical narrative is a particular bundle of silences, the result of a unique process, and the
operation required to deconstruct these silences will vary accordingly.14
I began this thesis to learn more about garbage and the role it plays in society in the
United States. Particularly, I wanted to expand the study of garbage, also known as discard
studies, to intersect more with my interests in environmental justice and history. Accomplishing
this requires a firm scholarly grounding in the theories and methodologies used in environmental
justice, environmental history, and discard studies. While unpacking the complexities of each
field, I realized that there existed common threads between the three disciplines, particularly
with regard to the creation of narratives and rhetoric. From my analysis, I began to wonder if
there was a connection between the historical and social narratives American society has built
around the concepts of “waste” and “race.” My thesis argues that a common rhetoric exists for
describing waste and race in the United States and this section not only serves as the scholarly
foundation for this claim, but also provides tools to assist in deconstructing the ties between
waste and race.

Environmental Histories of Justice
Before I can begin to tease out the connections between waste and race, I must first
establish the theoretical understanding I have of environmental racism and injustice as well as

14

Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995),
27.
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environmental history. The two disciplines may seem to operate from different standpoints, as
typically the social sciences and humanities have different approaches to research, but within the
scope of my paper they are quite aligned. My analysis of historical narratives that make up my
research are bolstered and strengthened through my lens of environmental justice.
Simultaneously, my understanding of the roots of environmental injustices is enhanced and
deepened through my knowledge of historic events. To further elaborate on my methodology, I
will briefly summarize the scholars who have influenced my research frameworks as well as
construct my own framework based on a blend of their methodologies.
As an environmental historian, I have often had to question my understanding of the
discipline. There is a colloquial mantra that states that those who do not remember the past are
doomed to repeat it, therefore we must study history to prevent the past from repeating. However,
I believe this is a false portrayal of why it is important to study history. First of all, while similar
patterns may emerge throughout history, events never repeat. Secondly, studying history does
not allow us to prevent events from repeating, but rather equips historians with the tools to
recognize how certain narratives and institutions came to exist. Michel-Rolph Trouillot is a
pioneer in understanding how power comes to shape historical narratives. Instead of falling into
the two established “camps” of history, positivism and constructionism, Trouillot ignores the
question of what history is and instead focuses on how history works. What history is can change
over time depending on who is constructing that history and pursuing it is a rather fruitless rabbit
hole, but in studying “the process and conditions of production of such narratives” we can begin
to understand how power has made “some narratives possible and silenced others.”15 In other
words, in the study of history it is not the story itself that matters, but rather whose story is being
told, how it is being framed, and why it is being told in this manner.
15

Trouillot, 25.
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Environmental justice theory relies on the understanding of history as a construction.
Much of environmental justice rhetoric centers around “space” and how low-income Americans
and people of color disproportionately live with and near toxic sites such as landfills, nuclear
waste dumps, waste transfer sites, and more. However, as Gordon Walker writes, “space” is
more than Cartesian distance, but rather space extends to “those of place identity, community,
process and procedure.”16 Essentially this means environmental injustice is more than just siting
a landfill near a predominantly black community, but is also reliant on the intersections of
people’s access to different spaces, such as access to a car to escape a flood. For example,
although two families might live the same distance from an incinerator, if one of their houses is
better insulated than the other, they will have better quality air inside their home than the other.
The perpetuation of environmental justice also relies on a constructed sociocultural historical
narrative that solidifies the public perception and stigma of a place that permits, justifies, and
maintains acts of injustice in a community. That is to say environmental injustices are a product
of the historical narratives created by those in power. Therefore, understanding how historical
narratives are produced to support environmental injustices does not just reveal “facts about the
past,” but an underlying power structure that creates and encourages these narratives.
With these frameworks in mind, we can begin to unpack more of the scholarly work on
the relationship between race and the environment. As Carolyn Merchant writes, “The negative
connections between wilderness and race, cities and race, toxics and race, and their reversal in
environmental justice have been explored by numerous scholars who have analyzed the ideology
and practice of environmental racism,” so environmental justice scholars have often tied notions

16

Walker, 630.
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of waste to larger environmental concepts and have also attempted to deconstruct these ties.17
Although environmental scholars have not linked modern environmental justice issues with
segregation and sanitation in the 1950s specifically, scholars such as Carl Zimring have made the
connection between waste and race before. However, instead of focusing on waste in the living
sphere, Zimring concentrates on the working sphere and how U.S. society perceived people who
worked with the American Waste Trades as “dirty” because of their “dirty work.”18 Therefore,
my proposition that American society conflates people of color, particularly black Americans,
with waste does not take a stretch of the imagination, given the scholarly work done on similar
topics.
As early as the late 19th century, environmentalists had begun to equate the city with the
blackness of dirt and moral depravity, while the “sublime” and “pristine” areas of nature were
white and pure.19 To add even more irony to this contrast, white settlers stole these pristine
spaces from American Indians and the dirty cities were built upon the forced labor of thousands
of black slaves for the sake of white Americans. However, because it is inconvenient for
American society to remember their actions, it has been glossed over in U.S. history and in the
history of the environmental movement. As Argyrou astutely notes, “In Western intellectual and
popular discourse since the 19th century, the ability to ‘master’ nature was a sign of higher
civilization. On this basis, those who lack this ability or perceive nature as a sacred domain have
been relegated to the bottom of the hierarchy.”20 However, over time the Western world began to
perceive nature as sacred and instead looked down upon those who have taken up the “means of
17

Carolyn Merchant, "Shades of Darkness: Race and Environmental History," Environmental History 8, no. 3
(2003), 380.
18
Carl Zimring, "Dirty Work: How Hygiene and Xenophobia Marginalized the American Waste Trades, 18701930," Environmental History 9, no. 1 (2004).
19
Merchant, 385.
20
Vassos Argyrou, “‘Keep Cyprus Clean’: Littering, Pollution, and Otherness.” Cultural Anthropology 12, no. 2
(1997), 159.
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mastering nature” or those who disrespect and litter the Earth as “inferior or Other.”21 Although
Argyrou is specifically referring to the Western world’s treatment of the Global South, these
notions can be applied to normative white Americans treatment of black Americans in the United
States because, “As a score of scholars agree, the two-hundred-year-old practice of slavery left
deep marks of institutional racism on social and spatial distribution of power, poverty, and
disease.”22 Through understanding how chattel slavery in the United States had an impact on its
historical construction of race, environmental justice can better analyze environmental injustices
that specifically target black people in the United States.
As an academic field of study and as a social movement, environmental justice benefits
from a deeper historical understanding of the creation of dirty and blighted spaces through
analyzing oral narratives and government legislation, which speak to the attitudes and prejudices
of people at that time, in order to understand the power structure. It reveals factors of injustice
that are not apparent in census data and zoning statistics. Furthermore, environmental justice
adds complexity to studies of environmental history through lenses of space and race. Through
combining the two sectors of environmental studies, my thesis will gain a more holistic
perspective on the ways waste and race have interacted over time.

The Dirty Truth
Similar to environmental justice, discard studies would benefit from deeper historical
analysis. Garbologists justify their field of study because of the consequences waste has on
human health and the ecological health of our planet.23 However, this understanding of waste is
not nearly critical enough to tackle the complexities of the “waste crisis,” the proliferation of
21

Argyrou, 159.
Dolores Greenberg, “Reconstructing Race and Protest: Environmental Justice in New York City,” Environmental
History 5, no. 2 (2000), 224.
23
Edward Humes, Garbology: Our Dirty Love Affair with Trash, (New York, NY: Penguin, 2012).
22
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human-produced waste. In order to solve the waste crisis, we must examine the
conceptualization of waste. The nature of waste is difficult to define due to its flexible and
conceptual nature, because “anything and everything can become waste.”24 What is trash in one
person’s eyes can be treasure in the eyes of another. However, although we live in a society that
produces so much waste, we keep our garbage hidden away. No one seems to perceive our
garbage as anything other than something to “take out” and bury, not something to examine
critically.25 In bringing issues of waste into the spotlight of academic scholarship, we are
studying what society believes is unwanted or unnecessary. In my research, I have found several
definitions and interpretations of waste, garbage, and trash. First, Greg Kennedy provides a more
philosophical and conceptual understanding of trash. On the other hand, Mira Engler uses waste
landscapes to shape not only her understanding of garbage, but also examines how society has
been constructed to push waste to it margins. Finally, William Rathje refers to garbage as the
“tattle-tale” that sets the historical record straight when historians rely too heavily on documents
or other forms of the written word.26 Through combining the perspectives of these three scholars
with environmental justice and environmental history, this thesis will achieve a more holistic
comprehension of garbage that will create a deeper understanding of marginalization.
Garbage, waste, trash, rubbish, filth, refuse, or whatever you wish to call it is not
something that is often discussed in every day conversation. According to Kennedy, the very
nature of disposability means it is not worthy of being thought about or discussed, but of course
nothing is truly disposable. There is a finite amount of resources on this planet and even if we
attempt to dispose of items and extract resources to make more, we cannot increase or decrease

24

Kennedy, 1.
Engler, 1.
26
William L. Rathje and Cullen Murphy, Rubbish!: The Archaeology of Garbage, (New York City, NY:
HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1992), 11.
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the amount of matter on this Earth. Given that we do have finite resources, how can American
society justify throwing away so many of those resources into a landfill? Kennedy differentiates
types of waste into waste that is offensive to our senses and waste that is inoffensive. For
Kennedy, waste becomes offensive when we feel that we have failed to maintain the durability
and usability of an object.27 For example, when we drop our phone in water or do not finish all
the food we bought, we feel shame and remorse for having to throw it away because we are the
cause of the damage. On the other hand, if we perceive that things “degrade beyond our control,
we think it unfortunate, but do not feel responsible” and therefore we consider it inoffensive
waste.28 We do not feel the same remorse we feel with offensive waste, because the degradation
was inevitable and a natural process. Most of the waste we produce today, such as disposable
utensils, fall into this category. These products are supposed to be thrown away after a single use,
so we are fine with disposing it because its life span is up. Imagine hearing a teenager died in an
accident as opposed to hearing a 90 year-old-man died in his sleep. Both are tragic, but the
former is more tragic because it was unexpected as opposed to inevitable. Justifying what makes
something “disposable” will be integral in understanding how waste and race rhetoric intersect.
Along the same lines, Engler’s scholarly analysis of waste landscapes challenged her to
tackle the concept of “margin” and “marginalization.” She notes that the margin is dialectical
due to the contradictory feelings of repulsion and attraction that stem from it. Although Engler
does not explicitly state it, her findings have significant implications for not only marginal
landscapes but also marginalized people. First, to dispose of something, she concludes that the
space being used for disposal must be considered as a “rejected landscape,” as it is the only place
suitable for rejected objects. Within the lens of environmental justice, this language implies that

27
28

Kennedy, 4.
Ibid, 5.
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neighborhoods with high amounts of landfills, waste transfer sites, incinerators, and Superfund
sites are considered “rejected landscapes,” because these are the sites of disposal for our
“rejected materials.” Therefore, living near these sites is indicative of also being “marginalized”
and “rejected.” Through marginalizing a group of people, the “rejected landscape” provides a
convenient scapegoat and sacrificial pawn that is “considered essentially unnecessary at the
moment but useful as a reserve for the future, a provision for unpredictable contingencies.”29
Zimring supports this claim in his research of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
when the industries that were created to deal with the increasing amount of waste were heavily
stigmatized. He writes, “Industrialists, politicians, and even progressive reformers… saw scrap
handling as dirty work, work that was not just physically dirty, but morally degrading.”30
Classifying a space as “marginal” in the discard studies sense will tie into issues of racial
segregation and environmental injustice within my thesis.
Kennedy and Engler have provided scholarly viewpoint from an environmental justice
angle, but Rathje is the key to understanding waste from a historical perspective. Rathje
conducted an archaeological and anthropological study of discards through the mining and
digging up of landfills named “The Garbage Project,” which operates under the driving principle
that garbage cannot be studied abstractly, but rather can only be understood when handled
physically.31 Rathje argues that archeology has always been the study of what humans leave
behind, whether these are government documents or children’s toys. Through interpreting the
purpose and significance of artifacts, archaeologists can construct narratives from a society or a
culture that is thousands of years old. In other words, archeology is the study of garbage with the
goal of understanding a society or culture. Garbage, therefore, has the potential to not only be the
29

Engler, 30
Zimring, “Dirty Work,” 80.
31
Rathje and Murphy, 9.
30
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key to understanding societies in the past but also the present.32 While I will not study the
physical aspects of waste, it is useful to think of garbage as a historical indicator of a society. My
thesis will incorporate Rathje’s perception of waste, but I will focus more on where garbage is
rather than what makes up the garbage.
Since the study of garbage is a fairly new topic, the narrative of the “garbage crisis” has
been understudied and underchallenged. The few studies that have been conducted have used
diverse methodologies and arrived at various conclusions, but these have yet to be synthesized in
a way that lends to a historiographical argument. Furthermore, the studies that have been
conducted so far only examine trash from a purely environmental and scientific standpoint.
Discard studies has focused on the amount of garbage, types of waste, and where landfills and
incinerators are located. Although these are all very important aspects of study, this narrative
lacks an analysis of how and why our waste management came to be structured in this way as
well as neglects to deeply analyze the effects waste has on more than just human physical health.
Waste and the people associated with waste not only have to deal with health issues, but also the
heavy institutional stigma that stems from their connection to waste. Through an
interdisciplinary study of Brooklyn, I hope to assist in the process of broadening our theoretical
and historical understanding of trash and how it affects marginalized people.
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Chapter Two: The Invention of Black Space as “Trashed”
I’m not a nigger. I’m a man, but if you think I’m a nigger, it means you need it… If I’m not the
nigger here and you, the white people, invented him, then you’ve got to find out why.33
- James Baldwin
The degradation of sanitation in black neighborhoods in the 1950s in Brooklyn stemmed
from an intricate web of factors. Through weaving together secondary analysis, newspaper
articles, oral histories, government documents, and historic images, I hope to construct a
complex narrative of the creation of “dirty black spaces” in the post-WWII era. From the
institutional racism that began to take root during Brooklyn’s founding to a letter to the editor in
the Brooklyn Eagle, each historic event serves to formulate a vivid narrative of the black
Brooklynite experience during the 1950s. Through exploring the formation of Brooklyn as a
Northern city with a deep history of slavery, I place Brooklyn in the heart of the development of
institutional anti-black racism. Building from that history, I inquire more deeply into the creation
of racial stigmatization in the 1950s through discriminatory housing practices and white
Americans’ collective opposition to integration. Coupled with the increase of waste in the 1950s
due to a boom in consumerism that overwhelmed Brooklyn’s waste management, segregation
and sanitation issues culminated into the solidification of central Brooklyn’s black enclaves as
“dirty” and “trashed.”

A History of Racism in Brooklyn
First, we must ask, why study New York City and, more specifically, why Brooklyn? For
my purposes, New York City, particularly Brooklyn, provides a perfect area for study not only
because of the role it played in forming societal constructions of race, but also because of the
clearly segregated neighborhoods. For a study such as this that requires samples from both black
33
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and white neighborhoods, New York City’s borough system provides a stepping-stone into
American society. In the future, studies such this can be applied to other large cities such as San
Francisco or Los Angeles. However, beyond the definitive color lines, New York City and
Brooklyn have fascinating histories as spaces built on the exploitation of African slave labor. In
many ways, New York City is similar to large cities such as Chicago or Detroit, but one thing
that separates it from these cities is that “New York’s whites enslaved blacks since the first
quarter of the seventeenth century” and this “legacy of slavery focuses an inequitable distribution
of well-being as old as the ecological transformations occasioned by the city’s founding.”34
Unlike other cities that were founded by white settlers and then received an influx of black
migrants, not only was New York founded on the labor of enslaved Africans, but also the
unequal treatment of blacks runs deep through New York’s history even before the “Great
Migrations.” This makes it a unique and fascinating area to study the effects of segregation and
other forms of institutionalized racism, because the structure of the city was founded and relied
on a well-established, yet covert racial power structure, which is responsible for many lasting
portrayals of race throughout American history. Therefore, teasing out this history will provide
much-needed historical context for the political, social, and racial climate of the 1950s in
Brooklyn.
New York City is made up of five distinct boroughs and these borders have not changed
much since the colonial period. Brooklyn, formerly known as King’s County, is one of these
boroughs and lies right in the center of New York City, as seen in Figure 1.

34

Greenberg, 224.

22

Figure 1. A map from Wiki Commons of New York City that delineates its boroughs
The Dutch and the English originally colonized New York City, then New Amsterdam,
as a trading outpost around the early to mid seventeenth century. On September 4, 1609 the first
Dutch colonists landed in what would later become King’s County, also known as Brooklyn,
within their larger city of New Amsterdam within their colony of New Netherlands. Enslaved
Africans from the existing slave trade from the Dutch West India Company became critical to
the agricultural development of New Amsterdam and Long Island. In Brooklyn the reliance of
black slaves was particularly strong, not in small part due to its role as a port city where many
traders first brought African slaves to New York. The slave trade to New Amsterdam was so
prominent that by 1660, it had the “largest numbers of urban blacks—free and slave—outside the
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South.”35 After roughly half a century of Dutch colonial rule, however, English colonial conquest
seized New Amsterdam in 1664. Although the Dutch defeat was due to Holland’s disinterest in
New Amsterdam because it was a colony that was more of a resource drain than gain, Governor
Stuyvesant of New Amsterdam chose to instead claim that they lost because newly imported
African slaves had eaten up all of the provisions.36 This blatant scapegoating reveals how antiblack sentiment had already begun to nestle deep into the history of New York.
Starting in 1664, New Amsterdam became New York under English rule, but more
importantly the Duke of York proclaimed immediately after his conquest that, “No Christian
shall be kept in bond slavery, villenage, or captivity,” except in the case of people who sold
themselves to indentured servitude of their own free will, but even with indentured servitude
there was still the promise of freedom. As evidenced by the term “Christian,” religion was
initially used to justify the separation of free men and unfree men in New York, but even at the
turn of the century, African slaves who had converted to Christianity were still unfree. Thus,
although Christianity was technically still used to divide the free from the unfree, situations such
as religious conversion complicated and challenged the narratives of what separated freedom and
unfreedom. Another example of this was in 1706 when the Legislature decreed that “children
with mixed heritage ‘follow the state and condition of the mother.’”37 Although this was
instituted to eliminate white male slave owner’s obligations to their children born out of the rape
of their slave women, it would later serve as a platform for the one-drop-rule system in the
United States understanding of race. New York’s development of racial understanding and
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racism did not stem from white settler’s natural prejudice against Africans, but rather it was born
out of necessity to justify the maintenance of slaves.
The American Revolution further solidified the position of African slaves as naturally
and racially predisposed to enslavement, because the Founding Fathers had to somehow justify
their fight for freedom while simultaneously maintaining their power over slaves. Furthermore,
instead of confronting and challenging the contradiction of advocating for freedom while still
owning slaves, New York specifically began to put limits on the numbers of African slaves
allowed in the state in order to homogenize. Even as New York began to become a more
commercial state as opposed to an agricultural one, it did not legally pass initial legislation to
emancipate slaves until 1785 and even then this did not put a stop to the practice of slavery.
Furthermore, in 1791 Brooklyn only had 46 free blacks, which was “proportionately the smallest
free black community in the state.”38 In 1799 New York gave itself the target year of 1827 to
achieve universal freedom, but once again even in 1830, 75 black Americans still remained
enslaved in the state of New York. According to Robert Trent Vinson, from 1857 to 1862, a few
years before the American Civil War, New York City was “one of the world’s leading slave
ports,” because the city turned a blind eye to slave smugglers who docked at its wharves in
exchange for bribes.39 White Brooklynites were particularly invested in slavery because, as a
port borough, Brooklyn not only benefited from the bribes from slave smuggling, but also
profited from the plantation cash crops from the South. For example, by the Civil War
“Brooklyn’s Empire Stores handled 90 percent of the tobacco that entered the city” and Brooklyn
was home to the largest sugar refinery in the world.40 Therefore, despite emancipating slaves and
legally granting universal freedom, New York City, especially Brooklyn, still relied heavily on
38
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slave labor. Wilder writes, “In Brooklyn, as in Virginia, slavery was a function of political
economy, not social psychology. As [whites] came to experience mastery over countless human
beings, they surely did come to assume their own natural superiority; that was not, however, the
product of a predisposition, but rather the result of social relationships.”41 However, although
this was the case, slavery was not directly essential within New York City itself, therefore the
reluctance of New Yorkers to grant and enforce universal freedom within the state speaks to the
solidification of their understanding of blacks as inferior to whites and therefore undeserving of
freedom. New York City is critical to understanding race in the United States not only because it
was founded on the unpaid labor of slaves, but also because, as a result of the nature of its
founding, it was one of the forefathers of the racial ideologies that built the basis for American
institutionalized anti-black racism.
It was not until the Civil War that Brooklyn finally “severed” its relationship to slavery,
but this was simply an end to a method of discrimination, not the end of the exploitation and
persecution itself.42 If anything, the Civil War inspired new ways to enforce anti-black racism
without the use of chattel slavery in New York. Without slavery to subjugate blacks, “In both the
North and South, substantial attempts to reshape American society between 1865 and 1920
included attempts to rationalize the space and race of the nation across regions using race as the
basis for creating order.”43 However, despite this, in the decades following the Civil War many
young Southern emancipated slaves viewed New York as a “refuge” from the persecution of the
South. They escaped to the North, particularly New York, because black newspapers, letters
from relatives, and job advertisements portrayed New York as a city of universal freedom.
However, “they did not imagine what an older generation foresaw—job competition from
41
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growing foreign immigration, deteriorating living conditions, and deprivation of civil and
political rights.”44 The older generation knew that New York City was not all it seemed to be,
because they had lived through a time when New York was once just as bad as the South and
also understood that white Americans were not so willing to give up their sense of superiority
over blacks.
As waves of the black migration hit New York after the Civil War, the older generation’s
fears were confirmed. Not only were freedmen who migrated to New York underpaid,
underappreciated, and given unsafe jobs, but also “they were huddled in ghettos, which quickly
became overcrowded slums.”45 Their poor living conditions made current New Yorkers perceive
black migrants as “unclean.” As a result, well-established black New Yorkers actually resented
black migrants for degrading their image. Before, black New Yorkers could achieve some form
of financial independence and stability, but as a result of the influx of black migrants, New
Yorkers began to think all blacks were impoverished and unclean, therefore closing off many
opportunities that were once open to blacks. Whites feared the entry of black migrants into their
neighborhoods because they feared property value decline and “race-mixing,” so along with
race-restrictive zoning ordinances, they also used violence and intimidation tactics to prevent
black migrants from moving into their neighborhoods. However, these actions were not solely
directed at black residents as white residents also felt this way about the millions of migrants
who moved to New York City from 1870 to 1890. The population of New York City quintupled
during this time period so although there was a high amount of black migration from the South,
black migrants only made up 3% of the population. Therefore, while whites targeted black
Americans in smaller cities such as Baltimore, New York City was actually able to absorb most
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of the black migrants into pre-existing “black sectors” before 1915. Other smaller cities, such as
Baltimore, did not have the capacity to handle the influx of migrants and so the first “real slum”
named Pigtown was created as a result.46 New York City would not have to deal with this
particular issue until the First World War.
During the First Great Migration during and after World War I, black migration increased
while immigration from other countries decreased, thereby increasing the total percentage of
blacks in Northern cities across the country. Before the First Great Migration, Harlem was the
“accepted the black enclave,” but from 1910 to 1930 the black population of New York
increased by two and a half times, making New York City the city with the largest black
population in the nation. Although Harlem was “the heart of black America,” it could not house
all the black migrants that arrived in New York, nor did all black Americans want to stay in
Harlem. Unsurprisingly, when black migrants attempted to move to Brooklyn they were met
with heavy resistance from white residents, but unlike cases of KKK violence in Staten Island,
resistance in Brooklyn never culminated in actual white violence thanks to the efforts of the
NAACP and the police department.47 As a result of the control of white violence in Brooklyn,
First Great Migration increased the population of black Brooklynites from 22,708 in 1910 to
68,921 in 1930, which increased the percentage of black Brooklynites from 1.4 percent to 2.7
percent.48 At this time, the black population of the neighborhood of Bedford was also increasing
and by 1920 8.7 percent of its population was black. In one particular district in the south of
Bedford, the black population of 2,341 almost equaled the population of native white Americans
at 2,376.49 This created some tension between the white and black residents, such as when a
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white minister of St. Matthew’s Episcopal Church told black congregates to worship elsewhere,
but because of the NAACP was committed to protecting blacks in Brooklyn, Bedford was on its
way to becoming the largest black neighborhood in Brooklyn.
All the work black families had put in to buy their houses, have their own businesses, and
increase their wages was shattered during the Great Depression in the 1930s. Companies slashed
black wages before white wages and fired black workers over white workers. Furthermore, many
black workers lost their jobs to white workers who took on the “traditional Negro jobs” of
domestic or janitorial work when they were in dire straits for work. No matter the economic
successes black workers achieved, the Great Depression revealed that black Americans were still
not valued on the same level as white Americans. In a time of crisis, the United States was
willing to sacrifice its black Americans for the sake of its white Americans.50
The housing market during the Depression was “frustrating for advocates of better
housing for blacks” because while the advocates won some victories, they also met with
disappointment.51 At the very least, the decline of economic incentives slowed down black
migration to the North from the South, which was a relief to the black New Yorkers who already
struggled to find adequate housing. The Depression also sparked more government intervention
in housing, but this turned out to be a double-edged sword for many black residents. The New
Deal of 1933 promised to clear slums and build new housing, but often the government failed to
provide adequate housing after clearing a slum, forcing its mostly black residents to find housing
elsewhere, which often meant attempting to move into a white neighborhood. White residents
firmly resisted any black families moving into their communities, but black Americans did not
stay complacent. Not only did the NAACP fight against race restrictive covenants and win case
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after case in the South, but also for the first time ever blacks held positions on the federal
housing bureau.52 However, despite these victories the New Deal also led to the creation of
organizations such as the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) in 1933 and the Federal
Housing Association (FHA) in 1934 that promoted and financially supported nationwide
segregation. The HOLC “provided advances to lenders and extended credit to home-owners in
default on mortgages” and the FHA was designed “to coordinate the government’s housing
programs and insure mortgage loans,”53 but while they did help stabilize the housing market for
white homeowners, it absolutely decimated housing opportunities for black homeowners.
Firstly, the HOLC established a rating system to “guide the investment decisions of
underwriters.”54 Private realtors and terrible neighbors could only do so much, but when the
HOLC began rating and evaluating the “risks” of neighborhoods it incentivized people to avoid
racially or ethnically mixed neighborhoods.55 HOLC categorized neighborhoods into four groups
and the communities that were too high-risk for loans due to “undesirable elements,” such as
low-income or black communities, were qualified as “red,” thus the creation of the term
“redlining.” Communities that were redlined could not even be considered for loans, basically
barring communities of color from purchasing property with the ease of white Americans.
HOLC’s status as a government-sponsored program gave it even more legitimacy in the eyes of
the public and in the eyes of many banks and realtors, giving them all the more reason not to loan
to black Americans.

52

Meyer, 48-49.
Ibid, 52-53.
54
Henry L. Taylor Jr. and Walter Hill, Historical Roots of the Urban Crisis: Blacks in the Industrial City, 19001950, (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 2000), 33.
55
Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993), 51.
53

30

To add insult to injury, HOLC’s system influenced the policies of the FHA, which
provided millions of dollars to the housing industry after the war.56 The FHA essentially made it
easier and cheaper for people to take out mortgages as a result of smaller down payments and
longer repayment periods, so long as the participants were white, middle-class suburban families.
The FHA Underwriting Manual (1938) included a section on “Protection from Adverse
Influences,” which stated,
Usually the protection from adverse influences afforded by these means includes
prevention of the infiltration of business and industrial uses, lower class occupancy, and
inharmonious racial groups… If a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that
properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes. A change
in social or racial occupancy generally contributes to instability and a decline in values.57
With such racist rhetoric solidified in a federal document, it is no wonder that black Americans
had such a difficult time obtaining housing. In addition, The FHA encouraged the construction of
single-family homes, incentivized families to purchase new homes as opposed to refurbishing
old ones, and required the HOLC ratings of a neighborhood before it approved any loans for
construction.
However, it was not completely hopeless for black residents because in 1937 the U.S.
Housing Authority (USHA) was created within the Department of the Interior, which would give
“$500 million for slum clearance and low-income housing projects.”58 The USHA made a
commitment to eliminating racial discrimination in housing, specifically in low-income housing
projects. During the Depression, many people, not just black Americans, required low-income
housing and were opposed to integrated housing, but despite the opposition the USHA enacted
“a more fair and equitable racial policy… than in any other branch of the Federal Government,”
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much to the relief of the NAACP.59 Although the USHA did not entirely protect black residents
from the effects of the HOLC and FHA, at the very least it did promise them a place to live. The
efforts of the NAACP to lobby for better housing also improved conditions slightly, but in the
end these efforts could not compete with the federally funded programs and the anti-black
sentiment of white residents who sought to “protect” their neighborhoods from “black
invasion.”60 Even by the start of World War II, black residents still remained fenced off into
ethnic enclaves.
The on-set of World War II would stimulate the economy enough to spark another Great
Migration of blacks from the South to the North in search for industrial jobs that increased New
York City’s black population to 10 percent of its total population.61 The job market that had been
closed to black workers during the Depression not only reopened, but there was also the creation
of new industrial jobs to supply the war. However, they were still barred from white unions and
better paying positions, such as managerial work, as well as paid less than white workers for the
same work.62 The Second Great Migration also began to push the boundaries of the color line
once again. The neighborhoods of Brooklyn that saw the highest influx of black migration were
Bedford-Stuyvesant and Brownsville. Bedford-Stuyvesant, a neighborhood that emerged from
the merging of Bedford and Stuyvesant Heights in 1920, contained the largest black population
in all of Brooklyn. HOLC predicted that Bedford-Stuyvesant “probably [would] be the center of
[the] colored population in the Borough within the next twenty-five years.63 HOLC’s selffulfilling prophecy pushed blacks into the neighborhood, while pushing whites out until it was
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49% white and 51% in the 1940s.64 Similarly, Brownsville, once an enclave for Jewish
Americans and immigrants, had its black population nearly double from 7,842 in 1940 to 14,209
in 1950.65 The increase was concerning to many white New Yorkers, as seen on November 21,
1943 when about 500 white residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant went to the Bedford YMCA to
complain about the influx of “sunburned citizens” in their neighborhood.66 However, as a result
of the United States shipping so many men and women to fight in the war, opposition such as
this remained minimal until the end of the war.
Findings from Brooklyn may not carry over to the rest of the United States, but because it
has served as a model of racial construction for so many years, it is a good place to start further
research in tying waste and race rhetoric. New York City, particularly Brooklyn, was built on
slavery and benefited from the construction of anti-black racism. Through the oppression and
exploitation of black Americans, Brooklyn could prosper as a trading hub, stay afloat during a
national depression, and utilize cheap labor. As long as Brooklyn could justify this oppression
through racist rhetoric and government ordinances, they could continue to use black Americans
to their advantage. Brooklyn accepted black Americans during the war, albeit begrudgingly,
because they needed the labor, but when the war ended would this still be the case?

Post-World War II Racial Stigma
Through understanding how Brooklyn was founded and its history of racial oppression,
we can better analyze the 1950s as an extension of these pre-existing notions of race. By 1945
Brooklyn had become a hub of diversity, but it had also established its color lines and forced its
black residents behind it, particularly in central Brooklyn, which had become the “primary locale
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of nonwhite residency in the borough.”67 As white residents took advantage of the post-war GI
Bill to escape to suburbia, economic disadvantage forced black residents to stay in the
deteriorating inner cities. The 1950s not only solidified existing color lines, but also used these
boundaries to delineate areas of neglect. Combined with sanitation issues and the political
climate of the 1950s, black communities became dirtier and more undervalued in the eyes of
white American society. Therefore, even when segregation was technically abolished in the
1960s, the association between blackness and waste still remained. To explain how this
happened, we need to unpack how white flight to suburbia coupled with housing discrimination
and redlining exacerbated existing black enclaves in the 1950s.
Scholars disagree about the underlying cause for the severe housing discrimination of the
1950s. For some, white Americans’ unwillingness to have black Americans move into their
space helped create and support the government legislation that institutionalized the
discrimination and incentivized realtors to avoid selling to black Americans. To others, the
government’s backing of redlining gave political weight to a common social practice, which
made it something legal and justifiable. Whichever line of argument a scholar takes, however, it
is generally agreed that “residential segregation is not a neutral fact; it systematically undermines
the social and economic well-being of blacks in the United States.”68 The segregation of black
Americans in the 1950s was no accident, but rather the culmination of the mixing of federal
mandates, local policies, and white fears.
One scholar in particular, William Fischel, argues, however, that “Rather than attacking
motives for zoning, which are typically unobservable and for which many substitute rationales
can be advanced, a more effective remedy would address the underlying financial anxieties that
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give rise to exclusionary ordinances,” but this is undeniably an ahistorical argument for two
reasons.69 First, to say that the motives for zoning are “typically unobservable” is to turn a blind
eye to the overt racism tied to the advent of zoning laws and redlining. Secondly, to propose
solutions without understanding the motivations behind the zoning laws would create ineffective
policy, no matter how “economically sound” it was. In unpacking the very much observable
motivations of federal housing zoning and redlining practices, I argue that discriminatory zoning
practices consolidated the black population of New York into a select few neighborhoods that
would serve as “sacrificial zones” that would receive fewer resources and less public funding
than the rest of the borough.
The increase in black population in northern cities exacerbated housing discrimination
practices. After World War II, many black Americans left the South in search of better work
opportunities. The mechanization of fields had eliminated the need for sharecropping and the Jim
Crow Laws made it dangerous for black Americans to stay in the South. As a result, the 1940s
and the 1950s became a prime time for black migration. For 39% of realtors in Chicago, for
example, their first experience dealing with “Negroes attempting to rent property” was sometime
between 1951 and 1955.70 Furthermore, as a result of the increase of industrial jobs during the
war years as well as veteran checks, “the ability of African Americans to pay for better housing
grew after the war. In 1947, according to Thurgood Marshall, veterans in Detroit reported an
ability to pay $6,000 for a home; in Newark and Cleveland, they felt they could afford $7,000.”71
With more opportunity and money, black Americans moved to New York in the hopes of a better
and brighter future.
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As more black migrants moved in the color lines they lived behind were forced to expand
outwards slightly, but more commonly landlords would divide up one-family apartments into
three-family apartments to accommodate more renters.72 Although blacks migrated from the
South for work and to escape the Jim Crow laws, they often found themselves sectioned off and
segregated into terrible living conditions. 73 Even worse still, these dilapidated apartments were
even more expensive for blacks than they would have otherwise been for white residents. For
example, despite the fact that homes in Brownsville were decrepit, roach and rat-infested, and
prone to fires, black renters were still forced to pay $55 a month, nearly double the $30 average
for Brooklyn, and had to finance their own repairs without reimbursement.74 As demonstrated in
Figure 2, many homes in Brooklyn were littered with garbage inside and out.

Figure 2. Trash accumulated in a backyard of a house on Moore Street in Brooklyn75
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The conditions were similar in Bedford-Stuyvesant, as Leon Modeste (See Figure 3), a
member of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth Council in 1948, noted when he described their
“‘tenements teeming with people… people who live in the worst houses, pay high rents… people
who feel like stepchildren… with garbage all over the place.’”76 Calvin Wedderburn (See Figure
3), another Bedford Youth, lamented “Bedford-Stuyvesant is neglected; it’s lost in the middle.”77
By the middle, Wedderburn meant “central Brooklyn,” which over the past decades had been
designated as the black hub of Brooklyn. Bedford-Stuyvesant was particularly known as
“Brooklyn Harlem.”78

Figure 3. Leon Modeste and Calvin Wedderburn: Two young black men who lived in BedfordStuyvesant in 1949 and strove to improve their neighborhood.
The working-class chose to live in Bedford-Stuyvesant because of its proximity to
industry and downtown businesses, but many middle-class whites interpreted the increasing
population as a cue to leave the city. As Meyer wrote, “the rhetoric of invasion has come to
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dominate interpretations of the migration. Most blacks did not intend to lead assaults on white
areas; they only sought better housing, but many whites interpreted the rhetoric literally.”79
Although Bedford-Stuyvesant was racially integrated throughout the 1940s, white flight deeply
affected the makeup of its population, causing the town to be the largest black neighborhood in
Brooklyn throughout the fifties and sixties. In Peggy O’Reilly’s article in The Brooklyn Eagle
she writes how severe racial segregation black Americans in Bedford-Stuyvesant created “ugly
sores of enforced segregation, ghastly slums, economic insecurity, [and] lack of educational
opportunity.”80 Purnell attributes white flight to “economic and political policies that went into
affect [sic] during the New Deal” as well as realtors who practiced “blockbusting,” introducing
black families into previously all white neighborhoods to drive down property prices.81 The
economic policies he refers to were the HOLC and the FHA, but after the war a new policy went
into effect. After the war, the government encouraged white Americans to buy suburban homes,
and leave the inner city, through cheap home loans through the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act,
more commonly known as the G.I. Bill, and the Veteran’s Association (VA). The GI Bill was
created to buffer servicemen and women against unemployment and economic disruption as well
as reinvigorate the economy through expanding purchasing power. The Bill offered a “trio of
benefits—unemployment pay while looking for a job, tuition and subsistence allowances for
further education or training, and loans to purchase homes or farms or to start a business.”82
Thanks to the bill, 42 percent of World War II vets were homeowners by 1956.83
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However, despite the tremendous impact it had on creating an affluent post-war economy,
the G.I. bill was not available to everyone, not even to all veterans. The bill was designed to help
veterans reintegrate back into society, as long as they were not women, blacks, or the working
class. As a result of deeply entrenched discrimination from federal programs such as the HOLC
and the FHA, black Americans were considered a “loan risk.” The VA mortgage program
required banks and building and loan corporations, which used the “redlining” system of HOLC,
to qualify veterans before they could receive aid. The VA and other well-established veteran
organizations barred black vets from membership, forcing them to join extremely segregated and
under-resourced veteran organizations. Even if a black veteran did successfully qualify for a
mortgage, the banks usually turned down their applications because blacks could only find
housing in “high-risk” neighborhoods. Faced with discrimination from every level, black ex-GIs
had to watch “the government’s dollars sanction the racial prejudice they routinely experienced
whenever they applied for a job or vocational training, admission to college, or a mortgage or
bank loan to start a business.”84 The discrimination of these federally funded programs was so
severe that by the 1950s the “per capita FHA lending in Nassau County, New York (i.e.,
suburban Long Island) was eleven times that in Kings County (Brooklyn) and sixty times that in
Bronx County (the Bronx).”85
In addition to federal policies and programs, private realtors played an integral role in
both discouraging blacks from moving into all-white neighborhoods so they would not
contaminate the community as well as encouraging blacks to move into all-white neighborhoods
to drive property values down. Although these practices may seem contradictory, both served to
benefit the realtor, but the practice he or she chose to use depended on his or her commitment to
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the white community. If they lived in the white community or had family there, for example,
they would prevent black residents from moving in, but if they were looking to get rich quick,
they would encourage blacks to move into a white community. With regard to blocking blacks
from moving into white neighborhoods, as a 1969 survey indicated, realtors during the 1950s in
Chicago represented their clients’ prejudices through their racialized housing policy. For
example, 70% of realtors were not willing to rent property in white areas to Negroes and 66% of
realtors believed Negroes’ entry into neighborhoods was not as good as whites.86 90% of these
realtors claimed that they notice a change in property values when Negroes entered an area,87 but
according to Suarez, the black Americans who moved into suburbs usually had a higher income
than their white neighbors because they had to pay more than the average white buyer to enter
the suburb. Despite this, white residents claimed that they noticed an increase of crime and
deterioration of the neighborhood.88 Therefore, even if the black Americans who attempted to
move into white areas were economically successful, the perceived “otherness” of these potential
black neighbors was enough to create the perception that the neighborhood had gotten worse.
White residents’ fear of black entry into their neighborhoods is known as “infiltration theory,”
because of the use of “invasion” and “infiltration” rhetoric in documents such as Real Estate
Principles (1955) and The Review of the Society of Residential Appraisers (1940).89
Other realtors took advantage of “infiltration theory” to practice “blockbusting,” which
actually encouraged a black family to move into an all-white community. Realtors would then
convince the white residents to sell their property and leave the neighborhood quickly before the

86

Helper, 329.
Ibid, 326.
88
Suarez, 251.
89
Raymond A. Mohl, “The Second Ghetto and the ‘Infiltration Theory’ in Urban Real Estate, 1940-1960,” in Urban
Planning and the African American Community: In the Shadows, ed. June Manning Thomas and Marsha Ritzdorf
(California: Sage Publications, Inc, 1997), 58-71.
87

40

black family completely drove down the value of their house. Many whites listened to these
realtors and sold their houses for much less than they were worth, just so realtors could sell it to
other black families for even more than the house was worth. Some realtors would even carve up
the houses into smaller apartments to make even more money off of black families looking to
buy any housing they could get.90 White landlords also participated in this deliberate degradation
of black housing, because like realtors they also “‘[figured] they [could] make more money by
cutting up apartments’” and renting them to multiple black families who were then forced to use
the same toilet and sanitation facilities that were only meant for one family.91 Realtors and
landlords carving up apartments for black families meant that an apartment curbside trash bin
meant to accommodate the waste of one family was actually holding the garbage of two or three
families.92
Meyer is correct to assert “neither government nor realty, lending, and construction
interests forged racial policies out of thin air”93 and that “they did not act in a political and
economic vacuum,”94 but I would take this claim one step further and say that both influenced
each other. Just as popular opinions about race and segregation served to inspire racially
restrictive government policies, so too did these government policies also serve to cater to white
Americans and justify racism. Even though the Fair Housing Act of 1948 and the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 should have prevented segregation, they could not reverse the damaging effects that
the federally defined discrimination policies had on the creation of black enclaves. The
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combination of “these two devices—zoning and racially restrictive covenants—effectively
protected socioeconomic segregation and limited the mobility of people of color.”95
Now that we have established how Brooklyn segregated its black populations into certain
neighborhoods, we will have to further delve into how the waste built up in these specific
neighborhoods. Although there are many reasons, some overt and others more covert, the most
obvious reason for an increase of waste is an increase in its production. After World War II, the
basis for the American economy shifted from government control and frugality to free markets
and individualized consumer responsibility.

Reframing Consumption
Sanitation and waste issues in Brooklyn stem from a multiplicity of reasons, but the most
basic of these factors is simply the fact that there was more waste. After the war ended, not only
did millions of men and women returned from service, but also after years of poverty people
could afford to have more children in what was known as the “Baby Boom” of the 1950s.
Beyond just an increase in numbers, however, there was also a shift in consumer mentality in the
United States that encouraged people to consume more and thereby produce more waste. For
example, in 1950 alone, approximately 5,150,000 tons of waste were sent to the landfill or
incinerated.96 During the Depression and during World War II, people had to sacrifice certain
pleasures and comforts in order to survive or support the war effort, but after the war was an
opportunity to cut loose and indulge once more. This is not to say that the American public
immediately released its inhibitions and began consuming non-stop, because the change to an
individualistic consumer culture actually met with quite a bit of resistance from protestors, but
rather that once the government enacted the changes, the American public adapted to the new
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social and economic norms of the 1950s. These new norms equated consumption with political
power, so suddenly consumerism represented loyalty to the United States as opposed to frugality.
As Lizabeth Cohen writes, the shift from “citizen consumers” who wanted to protect the greater
good of the nation to “purchaser consumers” who felt that the power of their dollar contributed
more to society than their political voice revolutionized the way and the rate that Americans
consumed.97
In response to the Depression, the federal government proposed the New Deal, which
reached its apex during World War II and “expanded the state’s power to shape the economy by
granting it the right to regulate prices, rents, and wages.”98 The stimulus package of the New
Deal was an example of functional Keynesian economics that pulled the United States out of a
decade long Depression that it would not soon forget. The general public, made up of groups of
workers’ unions, women, and blacks hoped that the government would continue their role as the
market regulator to maintain price, rent, and wage controls.99 Rationing and price controls from
the war had not only decreased living expenses, but also ironically improved the standard of
living for many low-income families who could now obtain fresh produce and meat with their
ration coupons. There were also social theorists, such as Lewis Mumford, who hoped that price
controls from war would help the nation “turn away permanently from the chase after
materialistic satisfaction.”100 On the other hand, there were firms and businesses that promoted a
free economy without government regulation that would encourage mass consumption instead.
They argued that mass consumption would promote economic growth that would increase the
standard of living and be beneficial for the United States in the long run.
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With the expiration date of the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply (OPA),
which was in charge of rationing and price control efforts during the war, rapidly approaching in
June 1946, the federal government needed to decide whether or not to renew the price controls.
Both sides were incredibly invested in their stance on price control, but the new bill Congress
passed was nowhere near strong enough to compare to the OPA’s former power. Congress voted
on the weaker bill because a majority of the senators feared that price and rent control was a
gateway to communism in the United States, so they fought to prevent strong government
intervention in the market. However, as a result of the weaker bill, prices skyrocketed with
overall living costs going up 6 percent. Although people went on strike to protest the weakening
of price and rent control, Congress still did not manage to pass a stronger bill by July, thereby
making the changes permanent. The ineffective price and wage ceilings not only doubled the
price of meat, but they also led to meat packers decreasing the amount of slaughters by 80%
below 1945 levels and withholding meat from the market. With dissatisfaction all around,
Truman removed the unenforceable price control measures, but it was too little too late. The
death of OPA spelled the end for a type of “collective consumerism,” which acknowledged price
controls and other market regulations as necessary for protecting consumers, maintaining equity,
and for the greater good of the country.101
Supporters of eliminating price control argued that governmental price control would
destroy competition and make the country complacent as well as start the economy on the path
towards communism. They advocated for a different type of price control that relied on
individual consumerism where people worked for their own self-interest that would maintain
prices at their equilibrium and raise the overall standard of living in the United States. The rise of
door-to-door salesmen who would give emotional appeals to suburban housewives to buy
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specific products that were guaranteed to dramatically change their lives is an example of the
individualized consumerism of the 1950s. Furthermore, George Katana expanded upon the
responsibility of individualized consumers who not only consumed for their own happiness, but
through capitalism were also responsible for the prosperity of the country. As Horowitz writes,
Katona believed “the optimistic and sensible consumer was a hero who would save America
from the inflation, instability, and depression that ravaged Europe in the years between the two
world wars.”102 Mass consumption moved accountability from the government and corporations
to regulate the market to consumers because as long as the “good citizen” was devoted to “more,
newer, and better,” the economy would thrive.103
The economic prosperity that followed the war proved to the United States government
that it needed to encourage a high level of consumption in order to sustain the economy.
However, this belief ignored that by the time the war had ended “the nation was several years
into what would turn out to be three decades of sustained economic growth.”104 Although the
results of this growth were not immediately apparent, programs from the New Deal provided the
foundation for the economic success of the United States during the 1950s, not consumerism
alone. Despite this reality, people believed in what they experienced and began to equate
consumerism with success and to heavily buy more and more. More specifically related to waste,
efforts to reuse, reduce, and recycle waste to save resources due to the war were effectively
stopped.
Although an undeniable factor, the increase of consumption is only a small factor in the
overall decrease in sanitation in the inner city. Many inner city residents were working class
and/or black and many of them did not subscribe to the mass consumption ideology. For one, the
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government did not grant them the same economic means to support consumptive habits as white,
middle-class males and their families. The GI Bill provided low-cost loans to servicemen and
women through VA home mortgages. However, because of federal programs such as the HOLC
and FHA, the working class and black Americans were considered “loan risks” and not granted
the same benefits as middle-class white Americans. Without the capacity to buy homes, working
class and black Americans had less money to spend on consumer goods, especially with their
lower salaries. As we have seen, the segregated inner city of Brooklyn consisted of mostly black
and working class residents, so why were the streets still covered in trash despite the fact that
central Brooklyn populations should have consumed less? In order to understand this
contradiction, we will need to examine the waste management practices of Brooklyn.

Waste Mismanagement
Despite the fact that working class and black communities in Brooklyn did not consume
as much as their suburban counterparts, Brooklyn neighborhoods were littered with significantly
more trash. While most suburban communities outside New York City received adequate waste
disposal services, inner city communities were not so lucky. In Brooklyn, waste lay in exposed
heaps on the street for days or weeks, terrorizing the borough with foul odors and vermin. There
are three main reasons for this decline in waste management and sanitation quality in Brooklyn
during and after World War II. Firstly, urban population increased fivefold in the 1950s alone,
which led to not only to a general increase in waste, but also a haphazard patchwork
development of cities.105 Secondly, federal spending cuts during World War II to expand the
military budget slashed public works projects and cut waste pickups in half, however, even after
the war ended, the government did not reverse the wartime cuts, despite constant promises to
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restore regular waste pickups. Black neighborhoods in Brooklyn such as Bedford-Stuyvesant and
Brownsville experienced particularly bad cuts to their sanitation. Finally, as a result of sanitation
workers in both the private and public sector going on strike, waste pickups happened even less
frequently. Due to the lower capacity of the Sanitation Department and private waste haulers in
New York City, Brooklynites not only had to deal with waste from other boroughs flowing into
incinerators and dumps that were located in their neighborhoods, but also had to live surrounded
by their own garbage.
At the end of World War II, New York City turned its attention away from wartime
production and back to its own urban development and improvement. The war had promoted
economic prosperity, but the city’s sanitation was not able to keep up with the rate of growth and
consumption. During the war effort, cities across the United States decreased waste pickups not
only because there were fewer people in the country to produce waste, but also the war rations
reduced consumption overall. However, when the war ended and the servicemen and women
returned with even more consumptive capacity as a result of the extra capital from the G.I. Bill,
New York City’s Sanitation Department did not restore the waste pickups quickly enough to
handle the sudden influx of waste. Furthermore, public infrastructure also could not keep up with
the rapid rate of population growth, which created “sprawling decentralized metropolises where
compact settlements once stood.”106 Not only did consumption skyrocket in the 1950s, making
more garbage than ever before, but the increased sprawl of people made the routes for collection
and disposal of waste more difficult as well.
With more waste being produced as a result of the consumer economy, the city turned to
building new sites for open dumping, landfilling, and incineration. Despite the increase of
landfill and incinerator sites, their capacity for waste was not equivalent to the amount of waste
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produced, so a good percentage of waste lay neglected on the streets. When Edna Ferber came to
visit New York City in 1953, she described it as a “scab on the face of the country” due to the
literal garbage lying on the streets.107 As made apparent in Figure 4, the lack of attention to
garbage in American cities led to the slow degradation of the quality of neighborhoods,
especially cities. According to the Department of Sanitation’s 1950 Annual Report, they staffed
over 1,500 men in the Bureau of Waste Disposal, who were able to collect and dispose of over 5
million tons of waste.108 However, this was only a small portion of the garbage that was actually
produced.

Figure 4. Clipping from The Brooklyn Eagle article that exposed the filth of Brooklyn streets109
How was such a prosperous city unable to restore a service it had provided during a
Depression, but not during a post-war economic miracle? For starters, by 1954 New York City
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produced and disposed of the most waste in the country, totaling at “16,402 tons of waste, or
nearly four-and-one-half pounds per person each day”110 in a typical November week. The
collection of waste had always been the most expensive part of the waste management due to the
unattractive nature of the job and therefore the high cost of labor, but at the time it was especially
costly because the spread of the population required more trucks and workers to fully cover the
city.111 According to Corey, the “DS spent more money than any other cleaning agency in the
world, though not on a per capita basis.” 112 Melosi also connects the expense of waste to
competing land use that resulted from increasing population because no one wanted a waste
transfer or disposal site near their neighborhood. As a result, many waste transfer and disposal
sites were located near the communities without the political clout to prevent the construction.
According to Melosi, cities could not keep up with the cost of the rise of population, so they had
to strategically choose what aspects of the city required immediate attention. During the war
waste management had taken a back seat, so federal and local governments typically maintained
the status quo of infrequent waste pickups for the sake of developing roads or bridges, because
these would benefit their community more. Therefore, although the Sanitation Department
attempted to improve sanitation services, the amount of waste it had to collect plus the increased
costs of labor and disposal technologies, such as sanitary landfills and incinerators, made it
difficult for the Sanitation Department to meet the needs of the city with such limited funding.
However, despite knowing very well it was overrun with garbage, the city government
still attempted to maintain their public image and portray the Sanitation Department as a
successful public service. For example, in spite of the sheer amount of trash, the Department of
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Health announced early in 1948 “that the refuse in the streets is not a health hazard and does not
cause offensive odors… ‘there is no danger.’”113 In 1949, Sanitation Commissioner William J.
Powell pledged to Brownsville and Williamsburg residents in Brooklyn that their areas would be
restored to their pre-war standard of daily garbage collection “as soon as possible.”114 The
specific date for the start of daily collection had not been set because it wanted additional
personnel and new equipment, but even nearly a year and a half after this statement the pickups
had not been restored. Helen Goldberg wrote in a letter to the editor of The Brooklyn Eagle that
her community of Williamsburg switched from daily waste pickups to pickups three times a
week in 1942, but by the time she was writing the letter in 1950 the pre-war services had not
been restored.115 While it is possible that it had taken more than a year and a half to get the daily
pickups started, is also interesting to note that there were also firm assertions from Victor Rayfiel,
the borough supervisor in charge of Brooklyn East for the Sanitation Department, that
Williamsburg already received pickups at least five times a week, which was clearly not the
experience of the residents.116 As a result of their negligence Helen Goldberg and many other
youths attempted to campaign to regain daily waste pickups at the Board of Estimate meeting,
only to be ignored when they went to the meeting.117 Therefore, it is clear that although the
Sanitation Department said it was increasing pickups, their statements were only empty promises
that blatantly ignored the experiences of the city’s residents.
The Department of Sanitation attempted to curb the garbage problem, but it only made
empty promises to increase waste pickups and clean up the streets. It claimed in 1949 that it
wanted to increase daily pickup areas in Brooklyn by 45%, but it did not have the people power
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or new materials and equipment this was pretty much impossible.118 At the start of 1948,
Brooklyn was promised fifty new trucks, thirty for East Brooklyn and twenty for West Brooklyn,
in the hopes of improving waste pickups, but of course it could not afford to buy this many
trucks.119 So by 1949, 28% of the 1,714 pieces of equipment the Sanitation Department did have
were under repair or “totally inoperable” during the post-holiday season.120 Furthermore, the
waste pick-up schedule it had was so disorganized that it further magnified the sanitation issues.
One reader of The Brooklyn Eagle remarked that there seemed to be no system to the collection
of trash. Sometimes the collection would be late at night and other times it would be early in the
morning. Sometimes the garbage collectors would leave their garbage cans in the middle of the
sidewalk, which was not permitted, so residents would get their trashcans stolen unless they got
out of bed at 11 PM to retrieve them.121 Without consistency, the waste collections were even
more inefficient and inaccessible to New York City residents.
Surprisingly, the Sanitation Department did eventually achieve six-day-a-week pickups in
half the city by 1949. However, the boroughs that needed it most did not receive six-day-a-week
pickups. While Manhattan received daily pickups in 1949, 65% of Brooklyn had waste pickups
only three days a week.122 Nowadays, most large cities have waste pickups for recycling,
compost, and trash only once a week so picking up waste six days a week might seem like an
unnecessary amount, but the structure of New York City’s waste management necessitated a
high amount of waste pickups. As described in The Brooklyn Eagle’s series on garbage in 1949,
the street sweepers consolidated all the trash on the streets to various intervals in their district for
Sanitation trucks to pick-up at a later date. Therefore, if a neighborhood only had pickups three
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days a week, the rubbish that was piled up on the side of the street could sit there for days, as
shown in Figure 5. This not only exposed residents to the waste, but also encouraged rodent
activity and allowed garbage to be blown away by the wind.123

Figure 5. The Brooklyn Eagle’s stark image reveals Brooklynites’ urgent need for better waste
management.124
Although the article did not explicitly state the name of the neighborhood, according to
the street names, the district in question was Bedford-Stuyvesant, which had never received
adequate waste pickups to begin with. As noted earlier, landlords and realtors carved up
apartments in black communities to accommodate more families. Therefore, even though up to
four families would live in a house in Bedford-Stuyvesant, the government only counted the
house as one to two families. Bedford-Stuyvesant might have been small in physical size, but the
dense overpopulation meant it required more pickups than its size suggested. One resident of
Bedford-Stuyvesant wryly remarked that she had not seen a street cleaner in months and that her
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fellow residents had to clean the streets and put all the garbage into cans themselves.125 However,
Bedford-Stuyvesant was not the only neighborhood in Brooklyn that had to cope with the
absence or incompetence of sanitation workers. Many neighborhoods around Brooklyn believed
the sanitation workers actually made their sanitation issues worse. In Brownsville, street cleaners
attempted to flush the streets with water, but instead exacerbated the problem because the drains
were so clogged with refuse. Instead of dry and scattered litter, some residents had to wade
through six inches of wastewater, which exposed their homes and their children to health
problems.126
In many ways, the state of sanitation was not the workers fault, since the Sanitation
Department was only a fraction of its original size. In 1949 the Sanitation Department had a
normal working force of 11,000 men, but only an average of 650 people work each day during
the winter.127 The department had a thousand fewer men on its payroll than ten years earlier,
making it difficult for the Sanitation Department to reach pre-war standards of sanitation. Not
only did it have fewer workers, but also given the increase in population and the increased
sprawl, the sanitation workers had to haul even faster than before. The sanitation workers’
negligence and carelessness that resulted from their tight schedules created a hostile relationship
between them and the residents of Brooklyn. In 1950, L.H.G. complained to the Brooklyn Eagle
in a letter to the editor saying, “If they take away your garbage, they spill half of it… The
Sanitation men make more garbage than the people.”128 Often after a sanitation truck rolled
through a neighborhood, it would be dirtier than before, because sanitation workers would knock
over trash bins and fail to pick them back up again. Despite the sanitation workers’ incompetence
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in the eyes of the Brooklyn public, however, when the workers went on strike, the residents
began to realize that they really did need them.
Before we can examine how the sanitation workers’ strikes affected the accumulation of
waste in Brooklyn we need to establish a bit of background on sanitation services and labor
unions during the 1950s. Within the classification of “sanitation workers,” there were two types:
the public workers from the Sanitation Department and privately hired sanitation workers from
private companies. Due to the responsibilities of the public workers to their city, they were held
to a higher standard than private workers. Their position as government workers would affect
their tactics in labor protest. Although the Sanitation Department handled most waste pickups,
the private waste sector made up a significant portion of waste management. According to a
1953 announcement in The Brooklyn Eagle from three presidents of private waste removal
companies, private companies removed about 40% of New York City’s garbage.129 Therefore,
even when private sanitation workers went on strike, it crippled sanitation services.
Unions had gained more traction during the 1950s as a result of workers looking for
protection against the increased mechanization and impersonal nature of jobs.130 For sanitation,
technological advances should have made their job easier, but “despite technological advances in
the 1950s and the 1960s, hauling garbage was still dirty and hard work.”131 As shown in Figure 6,
Sanitation workers still had to participate in backbreaking and disgusting work, which sparked a
lot of dissatisfaction over the low pay they received for doing such difficult work for a total of 48
hours, six days a week, which was more than the standard work week.132
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Figure 6. Sanitation workers push a car off a heap of garbage.133
The winter marked an especially difficult time for sanitation workers, as snowstorms would bury
the garbage beneath inches of snow that the sanitation workers would then have to dig through in
order to get to the waste. In spite of the hardships of their jobs, the sanitation men were severely
underappreciated, even by the city. As Stanley Krasowski, President of the Sanitationmen’s
Local 111-A faction of the A.F.L. union, wrote in a 1951 letter to the editor in The Brooklyn
Eagle, the city had granted a $250 a year cost-of-living increase to all of its employees, except
the sanitation workers.134 Furthermore, the Mayor ignored the pleas of sanitation workers and
threatened to suspend or dismiss them if they went on strike.
Despite these threats, the Sanitation Department workers organized and executed what
was referred to as a “slowdown” of garbage collection. On October 1, 1951, nearly a hundred
sanitation men called in sick to protest to shorten their hours and work week. Although the
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Sanitation department technically suspended all of the men, suspending them was effectively the
same as the sanitation men refusing to work, so the Department ordered all but 47 of the
sanitation men to come back to work.135 By October 4, the Sanitation had suspended 57 men
with the threat of more and 100 of the workers went on trial for their hand in the slowdown.136
Although the strikes did bring attention to the sanitation worker’s plight, not many people were
sympathetic to their “slowdown.” While the public believed that the sanitation workers should
receive adequate pay and more reasonable hours like any other public employees, they strongly
opposed using a slowdown strike as a means of achieving equity because of the adverse effects it
had on the city’s cleanliness.137 Furthermore, the strike was ultimately ineffective because the
Sanitation Department received funding from the city to hire more workers to alleviate some of
the build up of garbage. By October 17, the strike came to an end without any decreases in hours
and the Sanitation Department reinstated 322 of the suspended workers.
Private sanitation workers had a bit more freedom to strike and were not held accountable
to the same degree as public sanitation workers. At midnight on Monday December 7, 1953
1,500 members from Local 813, A.F.L., International Brotherhood of Teamsters, which
represented 225,000 commercial establishments in New York City and Long Island, went on
strike from their professions as waste collectors.138 At a meeting held in attempt to stall the strike,
the workers demanded an increase in wages from $55 to $77 for drivers and $47 to $70 for
helpers during the 40-hour week, but the companies only offered a $4 increase.139 According to
three private company presidents, the strikers’ demands would total to a 35% increase in costs,
even though they already worked less and got paid more than those in the Sanitation
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Department.140 This disrupted waste collection and left a hazardous amount of waste, about 40%
of the garbage in all five boroughs, on the streets that not only bothered the private waste
collection companies’ presidents, but also the residents of New York City who had to live with
even less waste collection that before.141 Although the strike did not affect most Sanitation
Department municipal garbage collections from homes, the amount of waste left uncollected
from hotels, restaurants, stores, private apartments and more still clogged up the streets and
posed a health menace to residents of New York City. Finally on December 22, 1953, fifteen
days after the strike began, the garbage strike came to an end and private sanitation workers
resumed their waste pickups, but there was hardly any reason for celebration. The union, Local
812, only gained a wage increase of $5, half of what they originally asked for, with a $1 addition
to both pension and welfare funds.142 In addition, some Brooklyn residents had gone fifteen days
without garbage collection, further exacerbating existing sanitation issues.
As a result of strikes from both public and private sanitation workers, Brooklynites began
to realize, “without [the sanitation workers’] daily labors, the orderly removal of waste breaks
down.”143 Even if the sanitation workers had justifiable reasons to go on strike, they still
contributed to the degradation of sanitation in many Brooklyn neighborhoods. Furthermore, the
increases in sanitation workers’ wages, while completely deserved, also served to raise the total
cost of sanitation services, thereby making it even more difficult to install daily waste pick-ups
for neighborhoods in Brooklyn. The strikes were not “wrong” or “bad,” but they are a factor in
the decline of sanitation services in Brooklyn during the 1950s.
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Due to a lack of funding and an increase of consumption, by the 1950s sanitation in
Brooklyn had severely degraded. Dr. Thomas Dublin, executive chairman of the Kings County
Medical Society’s public health committee and executive director of the National Health Council,
was quoted in the Brooklyn Eagle in 1949 remarking “there has been a serious breakdown in the
collection of refuse, garbage and other material throughout the borough [Brooklyn].”144 The
disrepair of their cities did not go unnoticed to many residents of Brooklyn and black residents
were not complacent about the increase of waste, but it took considerable effort to get their
voices heard. According to interviews in The Brooklyn Eagle from various black youths who
lived in Bedford-Stuyvesant, they noted that “in countless sub-standard dwellings sanitary
facilities are of the poorest” quality.145 Furthermore, the amount of waste in the streets was so
severe that when it snowed, children in Brownsville sledded on mounds of garbage left out on
the street.146 If the neighborhood was in such disrepair and if black residents were vocal about
these issues in the newspaper, why was it that the most well known waste protest in BedfordStuyvesant did not occur until 1962? Chapter Three will detail the factors that silenced black
voices in the 1950s, making them seem complacent about the deterioration of their homes.
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Chapter Three: Silence is Violence
It was a time when people were just afraid to talk. There were few people who were willing to
take a stand on any kind of controversial issue and if you took a stand, you knew darn well you
were sticking your neck out and you were gonna get it. And you just waited, not knowing what
time it would come, but knowing darn well it would come. That was terrible. It went on up into
the fifties, you know, the silent generation of the fifties. You felt so alone because there was no
movement. There was no anything. You were just one person by yourself. It was a really rough
time.147
Chapter Two explained how black neighborhoods became dirtier with neglected trash,
but the institutionalization of many of the reasons for sanitation degradation and housing
segregation happened in the early 1950s. So this begs the question, why did Brooklyn CORE
wait so long to stage Operation “Clean Sweep”? How did the Bedford-Stuyvesant residents put
up with nearly fifteen years of poor sanitation without any large and memorable protests like
Operation “Clean Sweep”? And furthermore, how did their sanitation not improve at all during
the 1950s? It was not the complacency or the ignorance on the part of the Bedford-Stuyvesant
residents that allowed the stagnant state of central Brooklyn’s sanitation, but rather it was a result
of the Sanitation Department’s blatant negligence of black communities. Furthermore, during the
1950s Bedford-Stuyvesant residents and other black neighborhoods across the nation could not
protest as freely. Anti-communist sentiment had gripped the nation, which stifled a lot of protests
aimed at social and economic equality. This chapter will demonstrate how the selective hearing
of the Sanitation Department and anti-communist sentiment silenced the voices of black
residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant and Brownsville.
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Selective Hearing
This thesis argues that black communities were the most exposed to waste during the
1950s, but this argument does not mean that non-black Americans were not also exposed to the
influx of waste post-WWII. In fact, every neighborhood in Brooklyn, black or white, had to deal
with a decrease in waste pickups and an increase in waste that littered their streets. Furthermore,
Brooklynites did not idle complacently as waste piled up in their streets, but rather they were
indignant and frustrated with the Department of Sanitation because their neighboring borough,
Manhattan, received daily waste pickups while Brooklyn received five-day-a-week at most.
Given this reaction, waste would seem be a borough-wide issue in the 1950s, not just an issue for
black communities. However, although the issue did affect white and black communities alike,
the response to their complaints from the city government was completely different. Brooklyn’s
white communities with waste problems received heavy media attention and were typically
rewarded with an increase in pickups within the year. Black communities such as BedfordStuyvesant not only started off with fewer pickups than white communities, but also never
received adequate responses to their plight. On the surface the post-WWII garbage crisis seems
to have affected all Americans, but waste-related protests and newspaper coverage of the lack of
waste pickups reveals that the government and the public only responded to the plight of middleclass white communities and hardly at all to black communities.
For this portion of my analysis, I will be relying heavily on the publications from The
Brooklyn Eagle, a local newspaper that was once known for being pro-slavery but had become
more progressive by World War II. The Brooklyn Eagle was dedicated to the exposure of
sanitation issues that it published a five-part series that focused on garbage removal problems in
Brooklyn in 1949. Their promotion of the advertisement asked the public, “Why is Brooklyn a
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‘stepchild’ when it comes to garbage collections? Why does Manhattan get daily collections
while 65% of Brooklyn has only tri-weekly collections? Are you violating the sanitation
laws?”148 Not only did the Sanitation Department respond to Eagle articles, but readers who
responded with letters to the editor also expressed their gratitude to the Eagle for shedding light
on waste issues. For example, B.T. Carroll, a reader of The Brooklyn Eagle, wrote a letter to the
editor to report that within three and a half hours after the Eagle published a story about piles of
trash at 56th Street and 3rd Avenue a Sanitation Department garbage truck arrived to remove the
garbage.149 Therefore, the Eagle serves as a good indication for whose sanitation issues were the
most important.
On August 13, 1946, the Brooklyn Eagle published a front-page article about residents of
Flatbush protesting the discontinuation of waste pickups along a block-long alley on Foster
Avenue. The Sanitation Department trucks used to make daily trips to pick up trash along the 80
homes that lined the street, but a week before the protest the Sanitation Department announced
they would stop pickups along the alley. Once, the children of Flatbush had played along this
alleyway, but with the discontinuation of waste removal it was more suitable for “swarming flies
and unpleasant odors.”150 Ironically, the reason the Sanitation Department stalled the use of the
trucks was because other Flatbush residents who lived on the other side of the alley on E. 45th
Street complained that the sanitation trucks were damaging their property and that it was
“unpleasant to see the garbage stacked there at night” for pick-up in the morning.151 The conflict
was a mere petty fight between neighbors, but the next day on April 14th, the Brooklyn Eagle
published another front-page article announcing the victory of the eighty Foster Avenue families.
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The acting district superintendent at the time, Anthony Spica, cited the Brooklyn Eagle’s original
article as his reason for continuing the pickups.152 This is an extremely underwhelming sanitation
issue, but it serves to demonstrate my point very clearly. Not only did this small sanitation issue
receive media attention, but it was also resolved within a day of the Foster Avenue families’
protest. One could argue that because the Flatbush case was a mundane issue, it was easier to
resolve because the Sanitation Department did not have to expend much energy or capital to
address the complaint. While this is completely possible, the Sanitation Department did not just
cater to white communities when the issue was simple and cheap. They also accommodated to
white communities with costly sanitation issues, such as in the case of Marine Park-Jamaica Bay.
Starting in January 1948 not only did the Sanitation Department begin disposing of
municipal solid waste in the Marine Park-Jamaica Bay and Mill Basin area, a neighborhood that
housed 40,000 white residents, but a local sewage disposal plant also started dumping its refuse
in the area as well.153 The garbage and sewage was meant to fill a shallow water inlet in order to
create a golf course, but after only a few months, it became clear that the sewage and garbage
was affecting the health of residents and the whole debacle was referred to as “The Great Stench.”
Residents began to complain to local newspapers and government agencies about the stench and
pleaded for its discontinuation. In response to these pleas, Harry Mustard, the Commissioner of
Health, publicized his report six months later in early July on the cause of the stench coming
from the Marine Park-Jamaica Bay area. The report basically repeated what the residents of the
Marine Park-Jamaica Bay area had been saying all along—the garbage and sewage was
responsible for the smell. However, instead of halting the dumping, the Commissioner
recommended actions such as hypochloride chemical treatment, chlorine treatment, and letting
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water run through the dumpsite so it was not stagnant water.154 To justify not halting the
dumping, the Commissioner’s report stated, “that no health menace exists—that no case of
illness so far has been found to result from the garbage or the smell,” even though there were
reports of people being unable to eat due to the smell.155 Thanks to this report, the Mayor
decided to rescind his promise to stop the dumping because they could not afford to build new
incinerators. This decision was not satisfactory for the thousands of complaining residents who
organized together to continue to protest the marine dumping, as seen in Figures 7 and 8. They
created a human chain across Avenue U to prevent sanitation trucks from passing through to
dump in their community. Despite claims that the fill would used to build a golf course, residents
suggested they take their garbage and sludge elsewhere and use sand instead.156

Figure 7 and Figure 8.157 Marine Park-Jamaica Bay residents form a human chain to put an end
to waste dumping.
Later that month on July 23, two groups from Marine Park-Jamaica Bay took legal action
to protest waste dumping.158 The first action from a trio of Marine Park-Jamaica Bay residents
154

“Health Head Maps Garbage Relief,” The Brooklyn Eagle, Jul 16, 1948, 1.
Ibid, 3.
156
“Says City Should Use Sand Instead of Garbage as Fill,” letter to the editor, The Brooklyn Eagle, Jul 24, 1948, 4.
157
“Health Head Maps Garbage Relief,” 1, 3.
155

63

pressured District Attorney McDonald to initiate grand jury action and indictments against those
responsible for the dumping, a move that mimicked the work of Queens’ residents, who in 1939
achieved indictments against their Sanitations Commissioner and Health Commissioner at the
time. Although District Attorney McDonald did not take on their case, he did note that the case
was already before the Supreme Court. The second action was much larger and was undertaken
by a hundred Marine Park-Jamaica residents who went to Flatbush Magistrate’s Court to
confront city officials, specifically Assistant Corporation Counsel Saul Moskoff, for their lack of
official action to end the dumping. Moskoff attempted to placate the protestors and postpone
their legal action “on the grounds that ‘city agencies are cognizant of the distressing condition
and that now ‘they are dumping mainly refuse there with very little organic matter in it,’”159 but
this bald-faced lie only made the protestors laugh. However, the most interesting aspect of the
complaints from Flatbush residents was when Mrs. Bertha Schalk threatened Moskoff, saying
“unless action to end dumping at Marine Park is forthcoming, she and other residents of the area
‘will take boxes and fill them up with that garbage and place them on the steps of Borough Hall
and City Hall.”160 Her threat is the predecessor and possibly the inspiration of “Operation: Clean
Sweep.”
After six months of complaints and less than a month of protests, on July 28, 1948 The
Brooklyn Eagle published a front-page headline that read “Sludge Dumping Halted in
Borough.”161 Thanks to the efforts of the Marine Park-Jamaica Bay residents, Richard Gould,
engineering director of the New York City Public Works Department, not only ordered the end
of the dumping of sludge in Marine Park that had terrorized its residents for six to eight months,
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but it was also decreed that a pile of the accumulated sludge and trash was to be moved about a
mile south “where officials hoped—‘it will annoy no one.’”162 In order to continue with the golf
course project, the Board of Estimate had to scrounge up $175,000 to pay for the sand and rock
that would be used for fill instead, which was a considerable cost that they had hoped to avoid
through using waste. However, the protests from residents proved to be too strong and even the
Borough President, John Cashmore, admitted “that the time for alibis has passed and the time for
action has come.”163 Of course, the dumping was not immediately halted but it was a step in the
right direction for many Marine Park-Jamaica Bay residents who were grateful for government
action at last. Although the solution was not as immediate as the Flatbush example, for the
Sanitation Department to make changes to such a huge project, promise to clean up the waste,
and pay $175,000 was remarkable.
Such a direct government action would be unattainable for Bedford-Stuyvesant or
Brownsville because the Sanitation Department would not even give them the minimum threeday-a-week waste pick-up. According to two different letters to the editor to The Brooklyn Eagle,
in 1948 the Sanitation Department only collected garbage once a week in Bedford-Stuyvesant
and Brownsville. The streets were only cleaned every month and there were only four garbage
trucks assigned to cover the entirety of Brownsville and a portion of Bedford-Stuyvesant.164
Furthermore, when Hilda Parnes and her neighbors complained to the Sanitation Department
about the one-day-a-week pickups in Bedford-Stuyvesant, “they got very angry that [the
residents] had the nerve to complain about the conditions.”165 However, the Sanitation
Department’s hostility did not discourage the Bedford-Stuyvesant Neighborhood Council from
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launching “an intensive and vigorous campaign” to receive daily waste pickups in December
1949.166
In his interview with The Brooklyn Eagle in 1948, Leon Modeste said of Bedford
residents, “‘Low-income people don’t have the drive. They are just too tired to be active in civic
organizations. There’s an indifferent attitude. People feel they are in there and stuck… they
shrug their shoulders and say: “What’s the use?”’”167 Perhaps it is true that low-income
Americans work long and hard hours to make ends meet so they can only be focused on survival,
but I would have to disagree with Modeste on this point. William Taylor, President of the
Bedford-Stuyvesant Neighborhood Council, said it best in his letter to the editor to The Brooklyn
Eagle in 1949 when he proclaimed, “We are going to continue our fight until won [sic].”168 The
Neighborhood Council passed around petitions for daily pickups to each block and urged block
groups to write to the Board of Estimate, the Sanitation Department, and Borough President
Cashmore demanding daily waste collection.169 Bedford-Stuyvesant residents demanded better
sanitation in a civil and peaceful manner, without resorting to protest, but their plea fell on the
deaf ears of the Sanitation Department, which only chose to listen to the complaints of white
communities.
Although all Brooklynites suffered from the decline in sanitation quality, white
communities not only obtained quick responses from the Sanitation Department, but they also
received substantial aid. On the other hand, the Sanitation Department treated black residents’
efforts to improve their sanitation with disdain and were appalled that black residents would ever
consider complaining about their conditions. Residents from Flatbush and Marine Bay-Jamaica
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Park protested for better sanitation practices, but the Bedford-Stuyvesant residents simply asked
for signatures and wrote letters. Why did they only escalate in 1962 with Operation “Clean
Sweep” when it was clear the Sanitation Department was ignoring their complaints? As we have
seen, Bedford-Stuyvesant residents were not ignorant or complacent about the purposeful
deterioration of their neighborhood, but the anti-communist political climate of the 1950s made it
difficult for them to protest in the same capacity as white residents.

Anti-Communism
The Cold War was a double-edged sword for black civil rights. On the one hand, white
Americans had awakened to more critical racial thought because the Soviet Union criticized the
United States for portraying itself as the “paragon of democracy,” while it still “violated the
rights of millions of African Americans.”170 On the other hand, the anti-communist sentiment
that stemmed from the Cold War also dissuaded protests for labor rights and housing equity,
because McCarthy era politics equated movements for social and economic equity to
communism. Anti-communist stigma drove the NAACP to conduct a “purge of all Communists
and Communist sympathizers from the organization” in 1950, because it was afraid of
“delegitimizing” their movement in the eyes of the American public.171 Within Brooklyn, this
purge isolated many working-class and middle-class blacks from the larger national movement,
which in turn decreased Brooklyn NAACP support for local movements in Brownsville and
Brooklyn. As a result, although local black activist organizations in Brooklyn wanted to protest
against racial injustices, anti-communist sentiment discouraged and inhibited larger organization
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such as the Brooklyn NAACP from supporting them, thereby delaying people of color’s
responses to legislative injustices.
Anti-communist sentiment began to creep into American politics after the end of World
War II. Public perception towards labor protests, for example, shifted from sympathy to
suspicion. In an interview in Refuse to Stand Silently By, Ralph Helstein joyfully recalls his fight
as a lawyer for the United Packinghouse Workers of America (UPWA) for higher wages in 1946.
Other strikes at General Motors and the United Steel Workers had achieved a seventeen-cent
increase, but the Packinghouse Workers had the unfortunate, or perhaps fortunate, situation of
President Truman announcing a plan to seize the packing plants as a result of strike threats.
Helstein recounts that several of the workers and union leaders were scared to go on strike for
fear of people perceiving their strike as challenging the government. As some of the more
conservative members said, “We can’t tell the government to go to hell.”172
However, Helstein believed that the packing plants’ importance to the government’s
image that the UPWA would be easily rewarded, if the workers simply threatened to strike. To
test this theory, Helstein met with Secretary of Agriculture Anderson and threatened to strike
unless they gave them the seventeen-cent wage increase. Although Anderson pleaded him not to
do so, he quickly conceded when it became clear Helstein was serious. Almost immediately after
the meeting, Helstein was greeted with the headline “Packinghouse Workers Defy Government”
in the Chicago Daily News. In the end, the workers only gained sixteen cents out of the deal, but
that did not stop one of Helstein’s friends from the OPA from calling him at four in the morning
telling him that the packinghouse workers were going to be responsible for inflation. It also did
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not stop “the stupid people” from believing the workers “did this because [they] were
communist.”173 Laughing, Helstein wryly remarked: “It was just because we weren’t communist
that we did it.”174
The UPWA had no communist ties whatsoever, but any inklings of defiance towards the
government or free market principles could be a sign of communism for those feared
communism and the return of the Depression more than anything else. The Second Red Scare of
the McCarthy era was a reactionary and emotionally charged response to this fear. As Cecil
Branstetter, a respected civil rights lawyer, mused, “people can be built up to hate something—
another country, or a race, for example—so much that they are willing to risk the destruction of
everything to eliminate it…The McCarthy era sprang out of that capacity for suspicion and
hatred.”175 Due to their own fear of American hatred, the NAACP and CORE bought into the
anti-communist narrative of the McCarthy era, which in turn sacrificed their relationship with
local grassroots movements in blighted communities such as Bedford-Stuyvesant and
Brownsville.
Many Civil Rights activists in the 1950s who identified as communist or socialist, which
posed a problem for other black Americans who were consequently implicated as communist as
well. Civil Rights activist and advocate of Soviet policies, Paul Robeson, told the Communistsponsored World Peace Conference in 1949 that “‘it is unthinkable’ that American Negroes
would go to war against Russia ‘which in one generation has raised our people to the full dignity
of mankind.’”176 Although Robeson believed the Soviets had helped societally elevate blacks,
not every black American agreed with him. Members of the Bedford-Stuyvesant G.O.P. were
173
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outraged at such a statement that essentially incriminated all black Americans as Soviet
sympathizers. They wrote a resolution that proclaimed their “love of and loyalty to the United
States” stating that “Never in the history of the United States has there been a Negro traitor to his
country.”177 Statements from prominent Communist black activists such as these convinced the
NAACP to blacklist notable figures such as W.E.B. DuBois and Paul Robeson. In such a
politically tense time, the NAACP could not risk subjecting their entire organization to the
scrutiny of McCarthyism.
The NAACP’s “hunt for reds” spread to its branches organizations, such as the Brooklyn
NAACP, which caused the group to frequently refuse “to participate in local protests because of
the political orientation of the organizers.”178 Even when Brownsville developed its own branch
organization of the NAACP, the Brooklyn branch provided them with very little support, making
Brownsville ineffective in organizing and rallying black residents. While the NAACP had
justifiable reasons to avoid being associated with communism, shutting out local movements of
working class residents, such as those in Brownsville, hurt the movement overall. For example,
when Officer Samuel Applebaum shot an unarmed Brownsville black resident named Henry
Fields for accidentally running into a parked car, Brownsville residents who witnessed the attack
protested against police brutality. NAACP leaders quickly moved to silence the Brownsville
residents and told them to “allow the legal process to investigate the matter.” However, when the
residents decided to hold a rally anyway, the NAACP quickly denounced the group, citing
“Communist affiliations” as the reason for its disapproval.179 Cases such as this demonstrate how
the tense political climate of the 1950s prevented civil rights activists from fully challenging and
protesting against racial injustices.
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After years of using anti-communist rhetoric, national black organizations such as the
NAACP and CORE had learned how to frame their movement to garner sympathy and appeal to
the masses. For example, when the trial of Jimmy Wilson, who was tried and condemned to
execution for the theft of $1.95, thrust the United States into the international spotlight in 1958,
the NAACP and CORE used United States’ fear of the Soviets to free him. One of the NAACP
spokesmen, John Morsell stated, “We think the communists will take this and go to town with
it.”180 CORE also warned Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stating, “if this execution is
carried out, certainly the enemies of the United States will give it world-wide publicity and thus
convey a distorted picture of relations between races in our country.”181 While these statements
from the NAACP and CORE as well as the international attention helped Wilson gain clemency,
it was not without sacrifice for the anti-racism movement. The NAACP and CORE justified
saving Wilson not because it was unjust, but rather because the communists and the world would
supposedly misconstrue how the United States treated its black citizens if he was executed.
However, the world was not misunderstanding anything. The United States did mistreat its black
citizens and granting Wilson clemency on this one occasion did not change this fact. This is not
to say these organizations should have let Wilson die, but they should have justified his release
because his trial was an obvious case of racial discrimination. The NAACP and CORE aligned
themselves with the government of the United States because they fought for the case using anticommunist rhetoric instead of challenging and protesting against the underlying institutional
racism that allowed Wilson’s arrest. In addition, their anti-communist stance condoned the
United States’ illogical fear and hatred of anti-communism, which further stifled a critical
analysis of the United States’ institutional racism. To be victorious during such a tumultuous
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time, organizations such as the NAACP and CORE had to sacrifice more radical stances in favor
of more conservative rhetoric.
The Civil Rights movement tends to mark the “awakening” of critical racial thought in
the United States. However, even in the 1940s and 1950s The Brooklyn Eagle contained articles
condemning segregation. One article from 1949 writes of Bedford-Stuyvesant youth, “The
ugliness of segregation and the evils that flow from it lead intelligent Negro youth to plead for
the spirit of humanity. They do this in a democracy founded on the principle that ‘all men are
created free and equal.’”182 Articles such as this are a nod to an increase of public consciousness
with regard to institutionalized racism in Brooklyn. Unfortunately, cases of local protests against
racism could not be fully capitalized on because local grassroots anti-racism organizations did
not have the power and resources of nationally recognized black activism organizations. The
NAACP and CORE’s decision to sacrifice local movements in favor of national recognition and
success might have preserved their legitimacy in the eyes of the American public, but in doing so
it failed in its mission to challenge institutional racism in the United States. As a result, vocal
black protests to poor sanitation in Brooklyn could only succeed after the extreme anticommunist fervor of McCarthyism toned down. However, the delay between the creation of the
environmental injustices and the protests against them made black Brooklynites seem
complacent during the 1950s.
The 1950s simultaneously awakened American race consciousness and suppressed antiracist action. On the one hand, “national pride in having defeated Nazism opened doors for U.S.
opponents of their own country’s racism, as did the Cold War identification of the United States
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as the champion of liberty.”183 International media attention on the inequities black Americans
faced thrilled anti-racist activists, but as Pomeranz and Segal write, “the era’s fervent anticommunism also constrained African-American movements, however, since emphasizing
economic deprivations risked sounding like a communist.”184 Although the American public had
started to take notice of the racist practices of segregation in schools, work, and at home, they
were more afraid of the threat of communism and socialism. Unable to protest for labor rights or
housing equity without inciting anger and retaliation from factions of anti-communism, national
black activist organizations such as the NAACP and CORE could not hope to succeed on radical
platforms that demanded economic as well as social equity. In an environment so hostile to
protest and change, the NAACP and CORE adopted the rhetoric of anti-communism to stay
nationally relevant, but in doing so they sacrificed the success of budding black activism in
neighborhoods such as Bedford-Stuyvesant and Brownsville. As a result, black Brooklynites’ did
not have the capacity to fight against the degradation of their neighborhoods and therefore
seemed complacent about their suffering.

Chapter Four: On the Margins
Waste and margin are inextricably related. The two are alike in many ways and are mutually
dependent. Waste is always marginal, and margins almost always include waste; in fact, they
invite waste.185
The end of World War II sparked the decline of the quality of sanitation in Brooklyn.
Although the lack of sanitation affected all of Brooklyn, the segregation of black Brooklynites
into enclaves through federal and local housing practices made them even more vulnerable.
Unlike for the white neighborhoods of Marine Park-Jamaica Bay and Flatbush, the Sanitation
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Department was not willing to clean up black neighborhoods such as Bedford-Stuyvesant and
Brownsville, which suffered the same, if not worse, sanitation issues. In the case of Brownsville,
the borough government was not willing to spend “scarce funds on new schools and services for
Brownsville was seen by the city’s bureaucrats as a waste—all the worthy poor were leaving
anyway.”186 The use of such rhetoric in the 1950s represented the solidification of the borough
government’s perception of black neighborhoods as unworthy of aid and attention—a perception
that white Brooklynites accepted. Through drawing upon environmental justice, environmental
history, and discard studies literature, I argue that that similar rhetoric is used to describe waste
landscapes and racialized landscapes because they often occupy the same space. I further argue
that urban planner Kevin Lynch’s definition of waste as “what is worthless or unused for human
purpose” also applies to white Americans’ perception of black Americans as a group without
social worth and supports their marginalization.187 Furthermore, black residents’ silence during
the 1950s made them seem complacent about the trashed state of their communities, which in
turn solidified the narrative of black spaces as naturally predisposed to unsanitary conditions. As
a result, the culprit of poor sanitation in black communities in the present day is not blatant
discriminatory legislation, but rather the socially constructed ties between race and waste that
justify the trashed state of black neighborhoods.
Despite the fact that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed segregation, Brooklyn’s black
population still remains heavily segregated, as demonstrated in Dustin Cable’s Racial Dot Map
(Figure 9).
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Figure 9. Racial Dot Map of Brooklyn based on 2010 Census Data.188
In Figure 9, each color represents a different ethnic identity. At a glance, one can see
some clearly defined color lines that separate the different ethnic groups, but a closer look
reveals a bit more nuance. Although the orange and red dots, which represent Hispanic and
Asian populations, respectively, are spread around Brooklyn, the green dots, which represent
black populations, are concentrated in the northern half of Brooklyn. Unlike other people of
color, black people are located in just one large swath of Brooklyn. There are no small enclaves
of black residents in a southern neighborhood of Brooklyn, for example, because black
communities gradually pushed outward from central Brooklyn. As blacks moved into
neighborhoods that bordered their ethnic enclave, white Americans fled to other white
neighborhoods. To this day, as evidenced in Figure 9, white populations separate themselves
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from people of color and keep their neighborhoods very homogeneous. Although segregation is
technically illegal today, the effects of policies from Brooklyn’s early history so deeply impacted
the psyche of its residents that such a clear separation between races seems natural and has lasted
for decades. As Zimring writes, “The conflation of dark skin color with dirt had become
common sense.”189
In Bedford-Stuyvesant during the time of Operation “Clean Sweep,” the conflation of
blackness and waste prevented any real government action. When the residents of BedfordStuyvesant protested their lack of sanitation, the Department response blamed the poor
conditions on “the human element” rather than on the structural reasons I have analyzed in this
thesis.190 By blaming the “human element” for the state of urban neighborhoods, the Sanitation
Department was basically accusing the black residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant of not taking care
of their neighborhood. Furthermore, if they blamed the residents, the Sanitation Department
could claim the neighborhood would not get any cleaner no matter what actions they took to
improve the waste infrastructure. As such, instead of increasing waste pickups, the Sanitation
Department suggested that CORE increase public education on littering and organize more
community cleaning days where the residents would clean the streets themselves.191 Robert
Moses, an urban planner for New York City during the 1950s, lamented the “urban negro
problem” by stating, “The City can’t do everything. Individuals, families, churches and social
organizations must do their part.”192 These statements demonstrate that the borough government
believed, or at least pretended to believe, that Bedford-Stuyvesant residents were at fault for the
trashed state of their neighborhood and therefore they were responsible for cleaning it up.
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In the eyes of the borough government, the onus of maintaining a clean community was
on the residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant. As long as they could maintain this position, the black
residents of Bedford-Stuyvesant could stay as “inoffensive waste” in their eyes and they did not
feel guilty for not helping their community. As discussed in Chapter One, American society
perceives things as “inoffensive waste” when it naturally deteriorates in an inevitable process
that is beyond anyone’s control. Just as no one is held responsible for the degradation of
“inoffensive waste,” the Sanitation Department did not hold itself responsible for the dilapidated
state of Bedford-Stuyvesant. Furthermore, once the borough government had accepted the
inevitability of Bedford-Stuyvesant as a dirty space, it could continue to justify segregating black
communities away from white communities. If black neighborhoods fell into inevitable decline,
then as long as they stayed separate from white communities, the borough hall had nothing to
worry about. As a result, segregation not only contained the spread of blacks, but also the spread
of waste.
Black Brooklynites were not only marginalized and treated like trash, but they were
forced to live with garbage as well. Delegating black populations and waste to occupy the same
space pushed them both to the “margins” of society. The margins do not necessarily mean on the
outermost part of the city, as demonstrated through central Brooklyn, but it is a space that exists
to quarantine the “rejected” away from the rest of society. The conflation of marginal racial
landscapes and marginal waste landscapes was not completely deliberate, but as the narrative of
“dirty black spaces” solidified in Brooklyn, it became a convenient explanation for the neglect of
both race and waste issues. In addition, black residents’ initial “silence” regarding waste in the
1950s was seen as their an acceptance of their new position as the marginal space. Even though
black Brooklynites became more vocal in the 1960s, it was too late to reverse the construction of
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“black spaces” as “waste spaces.” The borough hall’s institutionalization of their perceptions of
black Americans into government policies influenced white Americans’ beliefs as well.
Therefore, even when the segregation policies became illegal, white Americans still perceived
blacks as waste.
Tying conceptualizations of race to waste is not a new topic of discussion in
environmental justice literature. In Carl Zimring's Clean and White: A History of Environmental
Racism in the United States, he argues that “increasing scientific definitions of waste as hazard
and of racial categories in the immediate antebellum period established a foundation for later
racist constructions that posited that white people were somehow cleaner than non-white people.
This assumption defined white supremacist thinking.”193 Zimring traces back the ties between
race and waste to the post-Civil War era when notions of white purity from the Ku Klux Klan
(KKK) were growing at the same time as increasing sanitation science and heightened hygienic
awareness.194 From even as early as the mid-nineteenth century to as recently as the late
twentieth century, black Americans were “feared as a source of contamination” and “blamed for
their neighborhoods’ diseases and deteriorating built environments.”195 Although “American
constructions of race, of waste, and of their interactions have evolved since the nation’s
founding,” I argue that the politically charged climate of the 1950s and the increase of litter in
Brooklyn as a whole exacerbated existing notions of race and waste on an institutional level.196
This institutional validation of the perception of black people as waste justified white Americans’
poor treatment of black Americans. Furthermore, as a result of the sudden influx of migration
during and after the war coupled with white Americans’ lack of capacity psychologically and
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structurally to accommodate so many black Americans moving into their neighborhoods and
expanding the boundaries of the ghettos, “African Americans became so visible in many central
cities that some scholars defined their predominance and spatial isolation as indications of city
decline.”197 As Merchant so astutely notes, “Black neighborhoods became toxic dumps and black
bodies became toxic sites.”198
On a final note, when discussing waste and race, it would be negligent to ignore how the
construct of whiteness fits into this rhetoric, because “waste informs the construction of our
social and cultural values,” specifically with regard to race.199 This is particularly apparent when
it comes to the term “white trash,” which seems to be a stronger connection between race and
waste than between people of color and race. According to White Trash: Race and Class in
America, “Americans love to hate the poor. Lately, it seems there is no group of poor Americans
they like to hate more than white trash.”200 Newitz and Wray categorize it as a harmful
stereotype that is born from Americans’ lack of understanding that “white” does not equate
wealthy. While it is true that white people can be poor and that “white trash” is a harmful
stereotype, it is, as Newitz and Wray describe, another product of anti-black racism.201 To be
“white trash” means to not be up to the standard or the norm of what it means to be white
whether this is related to wealth, education, health, or temperament. This standard arose from
anti-black racism because whiteness as a concept was born in contrast to blackness in order to
justify white supremacy.202 The fact that the phrase “white trash” exists solely for whites
demonstrates how different the expectations are for whites as opposed to other people of color.
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As Zimring writes, “adding the word ‘trash’ to an individual’s racial identity threatened to
remove the power and privileges of whiteness,” thereby dragging this group down to the same
level as people of color.203 Failure or poverty is expected of people of color, so there is no
separate term for it such as “black trash.” Just as feminism fights the expectation for all men to
be strong and unemotional, so too does anti-black racism fight the notion that all whites are
wealthy, well educated, and healthy. As Newitz and Wray write, “shifting the diagnostic gaze of
critical race theorization from non-whites to whites will better enable whites to focus on the
ways in which white racism brings harm not only to people of color, but to themselves as
well.”204 Understanding the socially constructed ties between race and waste not only reveal the
ways that people of color have been subjected to unfair and untrue stereotypes, but that whites
have as well.
Conflations of waste and race have lasted beyond the 1950s in Brooklyn and future
studies on waste and race rhetoric should focus on its applications to Brooklyn in the present day.
One direction to take future studies would be in the recent increase of gentrification and urban
renewal projects in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Today Bedford-Stuyvesant is still one of the hubs of
Brooklyn’s black populations, but this is gradually beginning to change as more white
Americans move into the city in search of cheap housing. From 2000 to 2010 the white
population grew by an unbelievable 633 percent, while the black population dropped from 69
percent of the total population to 49 percent.205 This demonstrates that whites are reversing the
flow of migration to re-enter black spaces. However, white migration does not serve to correct
the stigma against black Americans, but rather it further proves my claim. As whites move into
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black spaces such as Bedford-Stuyvesant, they “improve” the area with urban renewal projects.
The “improvement” of the neighborhood then makes the area unsuitable and unaffordable for the
black residents. Instead of improving the neighborhood for everyone, white migrants are
reclaiming a neighborhood from black residents who are then forced to find neighborhoods more
“suitable” for them, typically cheaper and older housing. To understand how to integrate
communities and destigmatize black Americans, future studies on waste and race should focus
on the development of racial stigma in gentrification and urban renewal. Although it might not
manifest in the same capacity as it did in the 1950s, the stigma of “uncleanliness” has followed
blacks to present day Brooklyn.

Conclusion
Thus, any study of the driving forces behind environmental injustice must include a historical
analysis of environmental conflicts.206
The 1950s exacerbated and institutionalized existing notions of “white purity” and “dirty
blacks.” Even when the legislation that enforced the stigma was removed, the stigma still
remained. Therefore, I conclude with a possible remedy to the stigmatization of black spaces as
“trashed” is through a reduction in waste production overall and through purposeful integration.
The practical application of these two suggestions would warrant another study, but I end on this
note to provide a space for further critical thought on existing stigma. The first point is rather
straightforward as a concept, but extremely difficult to apply. In pursuing a zero-waste society to
reduce waste production overall, we can eliminate marginalized communities exposure to health
and environmental risks. However, this does not get to the source of white Americans’ stigma
against black spaces. Alongside waste reduction, we must also begin thoughtful and intentional
integration. This concept is different from gentrification where white migrants push out black
206
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residents because it encourages white Americans to get proximate to black spaces beyond just
physical distance. Dismantling stigma requires acknowledgement of its existence and getting
close to the issues in order to solve them. Integrating cities will serve to mitigate marginal spaces
and encourage critical thought about preconceived notions of race and waste.
Although this study is just a small-scale analysis of a borough in New York City, this
does not make it less indicative of current national environmental problems. As Taylor and Hill
posit, “one key to understanding the predicament of cities, formulating effective policies, and
creating initiatives to solve current problems is knowing the historical roots of the urban
crisis.”207 Not every facet of Brooklyn discussed here will apply to all American cities, but at the
very least my research can provide the foundation for further study on other large cities. Through
thickening the narrative of the creation of blighted black spaces, we can gain a more holistic
understanding of the causes for environmental injustice. Furthermore, in discerning these causes,
we can strive towards more effective environmental justice, which Merchant defines as “the
righting of the inequities of the past through laws, regulations, compensation, and removal of the
causes of eco-injustice.”208 If we are to right the inequities of the past, we must first understand
how the past was constructed.
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